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In the wake of the British withdrawal from the Persian
Gulf and the third Indo -Pakistani war, Iran's leadership
revised its foreign policy with the intent both of succeeding
Britain as the policeman of the Persian Gulf as well as
committing the country to a more active role in regional
affairs. Iran's Dhofar expedition in 1973 and. support for
the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq in 197^ posed a challenge to
Soviet interests in the region. Soviet concern was exacer-
bated further by the scope of Iran's post-7^ arms purchases,
by the success of its petro-dollar campaign to reduce Soviet
influence on the sub-continent and in the Horn of Africa,
and by Sino -Persian support for Muslim insurgents in Afghan-
istan. When the Iranian revolution erupted in 1978, Moscow
was initially content to remain on the sidelines. The Kremlin
is now actively attempting to improve its ties with the
Iranian left, however, in the hope of influencing the policies
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I. INTRODUCTION
The post-World War II era witnessed the ascendance of
Iran as the paramount force in the Persian Gulf. Immediately
after the war, Iranian foreign policy was primarily concerned
with mobilizing Western support for countering the Soviet
threat to Iranian territorial integrity. Once this was
accomplished and the immediate Soviet threat dissipated, the
Iranian government, under the leadership of Dr. Mohammad
Mossadiq, attempted to: (a) eradicate the vestiges of
British interf errence in Iranian domestic affairs, particu-
larly London's control over Iranian petroleum resources;
and (b) establish a truly nonaligned foreign policy. Per-
ceiving the latter objective as a threat to Western interests
in the region, the U.S. and Britain engineered the overthrow
of the Mossadiq regime. The downfall of the nationalist
government led to systemic changes in the Iranian political
system, which in turn resulted in the substantive re-
structuring of Iranian foreign policy.
In the aftermath of the domestic crisis of 1953 > the
remanetory domestic constraints on the arbitrary powers of
the monarch were swept aside, the pseudo-parliamentary system
was "totally abandoned," and Iranian foreign policy adopted a
See Shabram Chubin and Sephr Zabih, The Foreign Relations
of Iran (Berkley: 197*0. pp. 2-3.
7

2decidedly pro-Western course. Iran's membership in CENTO
and its subsequent bi-lateral accord with the U.S. were
designed as much to insure the continued viability of the
regime as to provide for the defense of the nation. The
Shah's dissatisfaction with Washington's unwillingness to
commit the U.S. to the preservation of the monarchy, however,
prompted Iran to seek a normalization of its relationship
with the Soviet Union, and engendered a foreign policy
shift away from total reliance on the U.S.
Iran was relatively successful in implementing its
"national independent foreign policy" until 1968, when
Britain's announced withdrawal from the Persian Gulf upset
the politico -military equilibrium in the region. The Iranian
leadership was surprised by the British announcement and
unprepared for their withdrawal. Iran had no cohesive gulf
policy, and Tehran was concerned that the Soviets might be
tempted to exploit the "power vacuum" created by the British
departure. Furthermore, the Shah was aware of Washington's
hesitancy to continue committing U.S. forces to such far-
flung areas. Encouraged by the U.S., the Shah decided to
assume for Iran the former British role as the policeman of
the gulf. Accordingly, Iran began building up its armed
forces, particularly its air and naval capabilities.
Even before the British had completed their gulf pull-out,
another regional crisis— the third Indo -Pakistani War-




The 1971 war motivated the Shah into extending Iran's
security interests beyond the confines of the Persian Gulf,
encompassing in the process all of the Arabian and Red Seas
and much of the Indian Ocean. In addition, the Shah became
convinced of the need to employ Iran's growing economic
wealth to prevent radical change and promote political
stability within the region. Once again, Iranian policy
changes were accompanied by a further expansion of Iran's
military capabilities. In developing and implementing a more
dynamic and regionally active foreign policy for Iran, Iran's
leaders overlooked one crucial factor: an ascendant Iran
might well be interpreted by "the Soviet Union as a threat to
its long term interests in the area.
A. SUBJECT TO BE ADDRESSED
This study will attempt to determine if both systemic and
environmental changes in the policy-making process in Iran
from 1962 to 1978 led to the development of a foreign policy
which was perceived by Moscow as a challenge to Soviet interests
in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean (PG/IO) region. Although in
recent years, as Chubin and Zabih note in their work The
Foreign Relations of Iran
. Iranian foreign policy and the
Shah were virtually synonymous, such a condition has not
always been characteristic of the Iranian policy-making process.
In the past, institutional constraints existed which served
to curb, to a greater degree than since 1953 » "the arbitrary

decision-making perogatives of the Persian monarch.
Therefore, some factor or set of factors must have developed
to either reduce the influence of , or eliminate altogether,
those traditional constraints on the monarchy. Such factors
could consist of internal systemic changes in the nature or
structure of the policy-making process, or of changes in the
regional or international environment which in turn affected
the political system of Iran, or both. As noted above,
parallel with the emergence of the monarch as the "unitary
rational actor" in Iranian policy-making was the development
of a new foreign policy which was intended to move Iran
toward a nonaligned position in the international arena by
reducing Iran's dependence on the West while simultaneously
normalizing relations with the Soviet Union. In order to
successfully implement such a policy vis a vis the Soviet
Union, however, Iran would have to insure that it took no
action which might be construed by Moscow as a threat to its
interests in the region. If subsequent Iranian actions
indicated to the Kremlin that Iran had in fact developed a
more assertive foreign policy designed to limit Soviet
involvement in the area, then the Iranian policy-making
process— in the absence of the traditional constraints on
the monarch—had produced a foreign policy which failed to
appropriately interpret and assess the regional security
interests of the Soviet Union.
10

B. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
In their study of Iranian foreign policy, Chubin and
Zabih maintain that in developing nations like Iran in which
the decision-making system is closed, and for which there is
little reliable information as to the functions of organi-
zational and institutional actors, the development and use
of a cognitive framework for analyzing Iranian foreign policy
is "extraordinarily difficult."^ While their contention is
accurate for the period on which their, study was based (1963-
197^) » the closed system which they analyzed was a recent
development in the history of Iranian policy-making. As the
revolution In Iran has demonstrated, moreover, the closed
system was alien to Iranian politics, and in the final
analysis temporary. This study will begin, therefore, with
an examination of the traditional Iranian polity, including
the position and role of the monarch vis a vis the other mem-
bers of the established elite. Because of the unique position
of religion in Iranian society, the institutional and societal
roles of Islam will be addressed. The discussion will then
attempt to examine another crucial set of variables which the
Chubin/Zabih study does not address: the Persian belief
system which formulated the images and impressions of the
decision-makers concerning events and issues in the outside
world. This portion of the study also will assess the






Due to the nature of the problem addressed by this
study, which requires an appraisal of the Soviet perception
of Iranian foreign policy, Soviet interest in, and the
formulation of Kremlin policy toward, Iran and the Persian
Gulf/Indian Ocean region will be analyzed. Soviet strategy
under both the Czarist and Soviet regimes will be examined,
as will the relationship between Soviet policy toward the
Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region and overall Soviet policy
objectives. The discussion will also focus briefly on the
domestic determinants of Soviet policy toward the region
in question.
From here the study will move into a historical context
for analyzing significant issues in Iranian-Soviet relations
over a 400-year period. A description of Iran's efforts to
maintain its territorial integrity in the face of successive
Russian attempts to penetrate the Caucasus and to conquer
Central Asia will be followed by an examination of Iranian-
Soviet relations since 1917 » Collectively, these two
discussions will provide a record of those Iranian-Soviet
interactions which have played such an important role in
influencing the perceptions of Iranian policy-makers.
The capstone of this study will be a description of the
domestic and environmental factors surrounding Iranian
foreign policy changes from 1962 to the present. Beginning
with the Iranian-Soviet rapprochment, this discussion will
attempt to place the evolution of Iran's independent
12

national policy in the context of changing international
conditions. Soviet gains and setbacks during the period
also will be analyzed both in an international context as
well as in juxtaposition to developments in Iranian foreign
policy. In conclusion, this study will attempt to assess
Soviet perceptions of the recent revolution in Iran, and
postulate the likely impact on Soviet-Iranian relations of





II. THE IRANIAN PERSPECTIVE: DETERMINANTS OF IRANIAN
FOREIGN POLICY
Before embarking on any study of Iranian foreign policy,
including an analysis of Irano-Soviet relations, it is
essential to first explore in some detail the socio -cultural
,
institutional, and environmental components of Iranian foreign
policy in general in order to develop a more thorough under-
standing of how those factors have historically impacted on
Iran's relationship with its northern neighbor. This chapter
will analyze the traditional political and socio-cultural
features of policy-making in Iran, including the traditional
role of the monarch in decision-making and the unique impact
of Shia Islam, both as an institution and as a value system,
in Iranian politics and foreign policy. Persian images of
the outside world which effect foreign policy decisions
will also be addressed. Finally, the chapter will conclude
with a discussion of the systemic and procedural changes to
Iranian policy-making which occured under the last two
monarchs and the effects of these changes on Iranian
foreign policy. It is the intent of this initial discussion
to provide a more rigorous and substantive framework for
analyzing Irano-Soviet relations, rather than in a solely
historical context, thereby enhancing a more profound under-
standing of the intricacies of the two nations' relationship.
14

A. POLICY-MAKING IN A TRADITIONAL CONTEXT
In Iran, as in other Islamic societies, government can
be characterized as the politics of personalism, i.e.
politics is "paternal, patriarchal, and patrimonial." This
means that politics is the purview of a limited elite, which
is itself dominated by the ruler or patriarch, who serves
as the "model, guide, innovator, planner, mediator, chastiser,
and protector" for the remainder of society. The ruler
governs society through "an identifiable administrative
structure fwhichj develops and spreads throughout the...
society" with the result that "the ruler's relationship with
the ruled tends to be filtered through a huge network of
bureaucratic personalities." Cleavages within society
manifest themselves along social, economic, and kinship lines.
As a result, rivalry and tension are "institutionalized" with-
in the society. Rivalry characterizes all "interpersonal,
intergroup, and inter-class relations" and pervades all
institutions of society "from the family all the way to the
7
national bureaucracy." Such a system necessitates the
James A. Bill and Carl Leiden. The Middle East: Politics
and Power




Ibid., p. 104; see also James A. Bill, "The Patterns of
Elite Politics in Iran," in Political Elites in the Middle
East
, ed. by George Lenczowski (Washington, D.C.: 1975) , p. 18.




existence of a central authority with the not inconsiderable
power required to arbitrate, mediate, and adjudicate between
the various rival factions. For about 2500 years of Persian
history, this role was performed by the institution of the
monarchy and the person of the Shah.
Q
1. The Monarch; "the hub of the system "
Historically, numerous adulatory titles have been
applied to the Persian monarch in an attempt to describe
the position of the monarchy in Iranian society. The Shah
has been known as the "King of Kings," the "Pivot of the
Universe," the "Sun of the Aryan Nation," and the "Shadow of
God." From pre-Islamic times, when Iran was the bastion of
Zoroastrianism, the Shah has been perceived as the embodiment
of the "Mithra-principle , " i.e. the monarch supposedly served--
like the legendary Mithra of Zorastrian tradition--as the
9living nexus between mankind and the divine. This tradition
added a "metaphysical dimension" to the status of the monarch,
enabling him to employ certain mystical powers in the course
of his rule. With the advent of Islam to Iran in the 7th
century, and particularly following the adoption of the Shia
form of Islam under the Safavid Shah Isma'il in the loth
Bill, "Patterns...", p. 20.
o
Pio Filippani—Ronconi , "The Traditions of Sacred
Kingship in Iran," in Iran under the Pahlavis , ed. by George
Lenczowski (Stanford: 1978), p. 57.
C.A.O. Yon Nieuwenhui jze. Sociology of the Middle East .
(Leiden: 1971), pp. 307-308.
16

century, the metaphysical dimension of the Persian monarchy
took on increased, significance as the Shah came to be re-
garded as either a "reincarnation of the twelfth /"or "hidden"
Imam"7or as the "agent of the hidden Imam." In either case
the Shah was presumed to be at least of a semi-divine nature.
While the supernatural capabilities ascribed to the Shah
were significant in legitimizing his rule in the minds of
his anagocially oriented subjects, his ultimate importance
lay in his position as the "pivot" or "hub" of the Iranian
political system. His power as the supreme ruler, the
12
Padishah, depended less on his coercive powers than on his
ability to serve as an effective mediator and arbiter between
the various interdependent, competitive, and mutually antag-
13
onistic components of the Persian elite.
Unlike traditional elites in feudal western societies,
membership in the Persian elite, at least since the advent of
Islam, has transcended socio-economic lines, making it a more
dynamic but less secure grouping. KLite membership was
drawn from:




12Reliance by the monarchy on a large standing army is a
recent advent in Iranian political history. Prior to this
century the only standing force was an archtypical royal guard
of limited size. For mustering a larger force the monarch
had to depend on forces supplied by the tribal khans.
13vC.A.O. Von Nieuwenhui jze. Social Stratification and the
Middle East: An Interpretation
. (Leiden: 1965) , pp. 53 and 55.
1^See James A. Bill, The Politics of Iran
,
(Columbus, Ohio:
1972), p. 30 ; see also Von Nieuwenhui jze , Sociology of the
Middle East , pp. 53 and 55.
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(1) the aristocracy— the royal family, members of
other "noble" families, ^ and the "economic aristo-
cracy" --large landowners and wealthy merchants—
whose wealth was based on royal patronage and
whose power and influence was determined by loyalty
l6
to the monarch, another contrast with western
society where wealth generally begat power.
17
(2) tribal leaders --geographically based elements
which could, and sometimes did, function as alter-
native centers of political, economic, and military
power to that of the central government. Tribal
notables often had large landholdings and filled
key positions in either the bureaucracy or the
military.
(3) bureaucratic and military elites—court ministers,
military leaders, advisors, principle functionaries,
1 8
and intellectuals.
(^) the religious hierarchy—a group whose influence
with the throne has been, historically, rather erratic
but crucial at times either for its support of or
opposition to both rulers and their policies. This
-^Marvin Zonis. The Political Elite of Iran . (Princeton
1971) » p. 121; see also Reuben Levy, The Social Structure
of Islam . (Cambridge: 1957), p. 100.
1 6
Bill, Politics of Iran
, pp. 9-10; see also Bill and
Leiden, The Middle East
, p. 80.
17 Ibid.; and Zonis, p. 121.
1 8
Ibid.; and Levy, p. 100.
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group is significant for its linkages with other
groups both in and out of the elite, for its ability
to mobilize the masses, and for its role as an
19
avenue of socio-economic mobility.
Within this elite, the political modus operandi for
20
acquiring influence or power was, and still is, bargaining,
which occured both within each group of the elite--such as
between separate tribes or between "noble" families--and
between groups— as between the religious hierarchy, the
bureaucracy, and the tribes. Bargaining consisted of offers
for support (allegience, troops, money, etc.) in return
21for influence (position or dispensation) . Although the
position of the monarch was ostensibly separate from and
22
above that of the rest of the elite, he was in fact deeply
involved in the bargaining process. Since the monarch
traditionally lacked a military force of sufficient size to
enable him to rely on coercion as a motivating factor, the
Shah was forced to rely on patronage as his primary means of
securing support from the heterogeneous elite and on
19 Zonis, pp. 212-122; and, Bill, Politics of Iran, p. 28.
20Leonard Binder. Political Development in a Changing
Society
. (Berkeley: 1962), pp. 227-231.
21 Ibid.
, p. 265.




consultation with appropriate elite members as the principle
23
method of reaching decisions. J Such a posture inherently
served to constrain the authority of the monarch by "binding"
24
him to the rest of the elite. The advantage of this type
of system, which Zonis calls a "flexible autocracy", is that
it allows the monarch to either defer or delegate authority
to any element or group, even those from outside of the normal
2=5
elite, should either the system or the monarch be threatened. ^
Even the area of foreign policy was not exempt from the effects
of bargaining, as various groups and individuals among the
elite began to develop linkages with foreign interests, the
most notorious being the competitive networks of linkages
between various Persian officials, families, and tribes and
either British or Russian interests during the 19th century.
That the roles of bargaining and external linkages remains a
significant factor in Iranian foreign relations is evidenced
by the recent scope of continued outside involvement in
Iranian economic, military, and political affairs.
27
2. Islam: the "stiff religious cement" of the system '
Although there is a natural tendency for Western observers








Bill, Politics of Iran
, p. 10.
27Gaetano Mosca. The Ruling Class . Translated by
Hannah D. Kahn. (New York: 1939), p. 3^5-
20

functions of developing nations, such an omission can result
in grossly distorted and inaccurate perceptions of situations
and policies, as much of the recent reporting on the Iranian
crisis has woefully demonstrated. Particularly in the Middle
East, where religion serves as the very fabric of society,
the impact of Islam as a continuing and viable force in the
political process, including foreign policy, must not be
overlooked. In the Iranian context, Islam serves two
functions: as a value system, combining in Iranian Shi ' ism
basic Islamic patterns of social organization and behavior
with uniquely Persian cultural traditions; and, as a vital
institution in Iranian society for meeting the social,
economic, and even the political needs of the Iranian people.
It is not within the scope of this study, however, to present
a detailed discussion of the role of Islam in Iranian society,
but rather to enumerate those aspects of the Perso -Islamic
heritage which have influenced Iranian policy-making in
particular.
Although in the past other Muslim nations adopted a
heterodox form of Islam, today Iran is the only Islamic
country to embrace Twelver (Ithna Ashari) Shiism as the state
religion. Like their orthodox Sunni counterparts, Shi' as
believe in the unity of God, the prophecy of Mohammad, and
life after death. Ithna Ashari Shi ' ism differs from orthodox
Islamic doctrine by its: (1) insistence on a hereditarily
determined line of successors to the Prophet Mohammad through
the Prophet's grandson, Ali; (2) acceptance of the Imams as
21

a spiritual interme diary between God and man, and therefore
the true successors to the Prophet; (3) insistence on the
infallibility of the doctrinal interpretations of the Imams;
and (4) recognition of the importance of reason (ijtihad) as
2P>
a necessary means of determining appropriate behavior. In
Persia, Shi 'ism took root because it was compatible with
Persian cultural tradition and because it fulfilled a
political need as well. Culturally the concept of the
charismatic, omniscient, infallible Imam was amalgamated with
29Zoroastrian monarchial tradition. One legend had it that
Zayar al-Abidin, grandson of Ali and son of Husayn, married
the daughter of Yazdigird III, the last Sassanid Shah.
This synthesis continued until its culmination during the
Safavid period when Shi 'ism became the official religion and
the Safavid rulers claimed to represent the "hidden" Imam,
thereby uniting in the concept of the Shahanshah Shia dogma
with the traditional Persian theory of the Divine Right of
31Kings. Persian Shi ' ism also borrowed heavily from
32Zoroastrian eschatological doctrine.
* Caesar S. Farah. Islam . (Woodbury, N.Y.: 1970), pp. 175-
178, 187-188; see also Charles F. Gallagher, Contemporary Islam
(New York: i960), p. 184; and Alfred Guillaume , Islam (Middlesex
England, 1956), pp. 115-120.
29
'Von Niewenhui jze, Sociology of the Middle East
, p. 191;
and Gallagher, p. 180.
30J Roger M. Savory, "Iran: A 2500-Year Historical and
Cultural Tradition," in Iranian Civilization and Culture , ed.
by Charles J. Adams, (Montreal: 1972), p. 85; see also Richard
W. Cottam. Nationalism in Iran , (Pittsburgh: .'.2964')
, p. 134.
3lNorman Jacobs. The Sociology of Development: Iran as





Politically, Shi ' ism was significant for providing a
mechanism for resisting Arab (and later Mongolian and Turkish)
domination and for maintaining a sense of "self -identity.
"
As a "rallying point for national political unity," Shi ' ism
33in Iran became the focal point for political dissent. J The
current crisis in Iran aptly demonstrates the continued
viability of Shi ' ism as a major vehicle for popular protest
"against the stress and disruptions that modernization
34involves.""^ Regarding the linkage which has developed
between religion and nationalism in Iran, Professor Savory
succinctly notes that "by adopting, and adapting to their own
ends, the Shi' i... form of Islam, the Persians forged a
political weapon of immense strength which has served them
well throughout their centuries of effort to preserve their
historical and cultural tradition, and in recent times has
3^
constituted an important element in Iranian nationalism. " JJ
Over the years Shi ' ism in Iran evolved, like its Zorastrian
predecessor, into a major institution in Persian society. The
33^Gustav Thaiss, "Unity and Discord: The Symbol of Husayn
in Iran," in Adams, pp. 116-117
.
34Michael Fischer, "Persian Society: Transformation and
Strain," in Twentieth-Century Iran , ed. by Hossein Amirsadeghi





Shia hierarchy, the ulema, fulfill two significant political
functions. In the first place, the ulema serve as the guardians
of legitimacy vis a vis the secular political authority.
Although the religious establishment long ago delegated to
the political authority the right to protect society,
ostensibly until the return of the "hidden" Imam, it in fact
has retained the right to saction the secular authority,
including the authority to: (l) legitimize, on the order of
a court of last resort, the policies of a secular regime;
(2) the authority (as was most recently demonstrated) to
withdraw sanction from a secular authority which consistently
abuses its privilege; and, in turn, (3) the power to determine
the nature of a successor authority. Thus the ulema can go
into opposition "whenever their moral sensibilities have been
.
. 37
offended" by the policies or actions of the secular authority. -"
In addition to its watch-dog role, the Shia hierarchy is
politically significant as a mechanism for channeling inputs
from other groups into the system and for providing feedback
to those groups on the regime's response to their demands.
Serving as the primary link between non-elite elements and
the political authority, the ulema are in a unique position
to influence policy decisions. One of the groups with which
of.
For a contrasting viewpoint based on the position of





the ulema have traditionally had strong ties has been the
bazaar merchants. Jacobs notes that "the bazaar and the
mosque often have been contiguous ." J Other domestic elements
linked with the ulema through the lower clergy or mullahs
include students, lower ranking civil servants and semi-
skilled labor, all of which also have been the primary focus
39
of the secular opposition, particularly the National Front.
The religious establishment in Iran has also been an
important factor in foreign policy-making due primarily to
its ability to mobilize either support for, or opposition
against, a given policy. In 1891 a coalition of ulema, bazaari
,
and liberal intellectuals succeeded in overturning a decision
by Nasr al-Din Shah to grant a tobacco concession to the
British. Although the nature of Russian historical involve-
ment in Iran will be discussed in detail later in the study,
opposition by the ulema to various attempts byCzarist and
Soviet Russia to obtain oil and other concessions in Iran
has been consistent and vociferous. Needless to say, foreign
powers have become aware also of the influence of the ulema
in Iranian policy-making. As will be discussed later, the
British frequently supported the religious-tribal-bazaari





See Nikki R. Keddie, Religion and Rebellion in Iran
(London: 1966) , for a complete analysis of the various forces




That the British eventually lost the support of that alliance
during the oil nationalization crisis of 1951-53 was also
significant. Washington was able successfully to mobilize
support for the Shah's return in 1953 through the bazaari-
ulema link. The final chapter on the influence of the
religious establishment is still to be written, but its role
in the current crisis in both unseating the monarch and his
appointed successor and in forging a re-alignment in U.S.-
Iranian relations needs no discussion. In this respect,
Dr. Jacobs warning that "it would be a grave error to ignore
the religious element in Iranian nationalism" and foreign
policy was prophetic
.
B. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONDITIONS AND EVENTS IN THE
EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT AND IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY
Interwoven with the socio-cultural determinants of Iranian
foreign policy discussed in the preceding section there exists
a complex geo-political framework, image pattern, or screen
through which Persians have traditionally filtered information
concerning situations in the outside world. According to the
tenets of Islam, the world is divided into the "Dar al-Islam,"
the region of peace, and the "Dar al-Harb," the region of
conflict. The nature of the relationship between the two was
traditionally assumed to be one of competition, if not actual
hostility. Muslims further believed that, due to the spiritual
and moral superiority of Islam as a way of life, the "Dar al-
Harb" would gradually diminish in size and importance as
in
territories and societies within it converted to Islam.
^ISee Farah, pp. I58-I0O, and Raphael Patai, Society ,
Culture, and Change in the Middle East , Third, Enlarged Edition
(Philadelphia: 1971), pp. 355-356 & 4-2.
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In Iran, this concept was refined into one which described
the outside world in terms of three concentric circles, with
the two inner most circles corresponding to the "Dar al-
Islam" and the outer and largest circle to the "Dar al-Harb.
The smallest and innermost circle corresponded to Iran's
perceived area of vital national interest and, in addition to
the area of modern Iran, included the Caucasus, the Trans-
Caucasus region south of the Oxus , Mesopotamia and the
Persian Gulf littoral, and the region west of the Indus. Most
of the remainder of the Islamic World was included in the
second circle, which depicted the area of significant, but
less than vital, interest to Iran. Enclosed within this
circle was most of what today is generally accepted as the
Near East: Central Asia, the Eastern Mediterranean littoral
and the Arabian Sea littoral. Encompassing the non-Islamic
.regions of the "Dar al-Harb" the third circle included the
remainder of the Old World areas of the Eurasian and African
continents
.
What was unique about the Iranian perception of the world,
which differentiated it from the perceptions of the other
great Islamic empires— the Arabs, the Turks, and the Moghuls
of India—was that Iran viewed the external environment not
as an area predestined to subjegation under the liberating
swords of righteous conquerors, but rather as an area from
which powerful forces would be periodically unleashed by some
42Richard Burt, "Power and the Peacock Throne," Round
Table
,
Vol. 260 (October 1975), p. 351.
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unseen malevolent force in an attempt to destroy the great
and glorious heritage of Persian culture. In other words,
the Iranian perception was one of apprehension, anxiety, and
insecurity, resulting in a strategy within its foreign policy
which was essentially defensive in nature. It was a strategy
born perhaps as early as Alexander's conquest of Persia in
330 B.C. and later tempered by the Arab and Mongol invasions
of the 7th and 13th centuries A.D. respectively. Iranian
foreign policy emerged then as a reflection of what some
modern observers have identified as an inherent and acute
feeling of insecurity within Iranian society as a whole. ^
Another aspect of Persian culture which complemented their
defensive strategy was the flexibility which they consistently
demonstrated when faced with an adversary of overwhelming
military superiority. This was especially evident in both the
Arab and Mongol conquests. In both of these instances, the
relatively high level of efficiency of Persian administration
and the advanced state of Persian civilization, coupled with
the willingness of Persians to pragmatically adapt to such
changes in their environment by utilizing their bureaucratic
and cultural talents in the service of their conquerors,
enabled them to "always conquer and absorb their conquerors."
With the founding of the Safavid dynasty in the l6th
century, Iranian perception of the external threat began to
^3^See Zonis , Chapter 7, and Bill, p. 15.
Peter Avery. Modern Iran . (London: 1965), p. 15,
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focus more intently on the clanger from the north. As a
subsequent section of this study will discuss in some detail,
concern about the northern threat was to become a permanent
feature of Iranian strategy for centuries to come. By the
l6th century the Arab threat had long dissipated, Ottoman
attention was directed west and north and an eastern threat
was not to re-appear until the 18th century. A third factor
of Iranian foreign policy which mirrored a feature of
domestic politics was the use of diplomatic bargaining by
Persia to maintain its independence and territorial integrity.
This policy was at least partially necessitated by the failure
of the Persians to modernize their military apparatus..
Although during ancient times, particularly during the
period of "the 10,000 immortals" of the Achaemenid dynasty,
Persia maintained a highly effective standing army, over the
centuries later dynasties relied increasingly on untrained
forces supplied by either local satraps and tribal chiefs or
on paid mercenaries. This problem was particularly acute
during the latter years of the Sassanid and Safavid Empires.
After a brief revival under Nadir Shah in the mid-l8th century,
the condition of the military again declined under the Qajars
until the late 19th century when the Shah began to employ
foreign officers to train and command a standing force.
^See Von Nieuwenhuijze , Sociology of the Middle East
,
p. 303-
See U.S., Department of the Army, Area Handbook for Iran
,
2nd ed. , by Harvey H. Smith et. al. , DA PAM 550-68 (Washington
D.C., 1971) pP . 557-579.
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Lacking an effective army to rely on when threatened by an
external power, Persia sought to defend her interests by
seeking support from the threatening power's major inter-
national rival. As a subsequent section will show, this
strategy by Persia was, for centuries, greatly enhanced by
Anglo-Russian competition in the region. Due to the ambiguity
inherent in such a precarious policy, Persia attempted to
buttress its position by seeking out a third great power to
defuse the intrinsic Anglo-Russian rivalry. France, Germany,
and the U.S. were all, at one time or another, contenders for
the third-power role, with the latter ultimately replacing
the British as a primary superpower competitor.
C. POLICY-MAKING IN A CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT
At the time of this writing, the monarch who has ruled
Iran for 37 years in both the best and worst traditions of
the classical oriental despot has left the country for what
officially was termed a vacation, but which ultimately may
prove to be his de facto abdication as the second Pahlavi
dynast. Although his future return to Iran must remain
within the realm of possibility until such a time as he
might formally abdicate, the likelihood of such a comeback
appears to diminish almost daily. What remains a very viable
issue, however, and one which is currently being debated
both within and without Iran, is the future of the monarchy
itself as an institution of Iranian society.
Even though the continued viability of the monarchy as
a political institution in Iran is questionable, there are
30

several substantive reasons which counsel against prematurely-
discounting the policy-making role of the monarch in any
study of Iranian foreign policy. In the first place, policy-
making in Iran, as previously noted, has been traditionally
authoritarian. The systemic characteristics of Iranian
politics are such that, even should the present Shah eventually
abdicate or otherwise cease to function as a ruling monarch,
his successor—whether prime minister, president, party
chairman, ayatollah, or general—will find himself as the
focal point of the same patrimonial mechanism which served
the Shah. Throughout the centuries of Iranian civilization,
this mechanism has become institutionalized into a bureau-
cratic organization whose primary, if not only, function is
to implement the policy directives of the nation's leader.
When the Shah's successor finally emerges, not only will
the system be poised to put forth its best effort in service
to the new leader, but also the nature of the patrimonial
system itself will be a tremendous temptation to the emergent
leader to simply fill the power vacuum. Although Iran's new
leader may not be called a Shah, it will be the all-powerful
shoes of the monarch that he in fact shall fill. Additionally,
as was discussed previously, the monarchy in Iran, besides
its obvious political role, plays a longstanding and deeply
inculturated religious function, one which can be reclaimed
by the religious establishment but which seemingly could not
be transferred to a purely secular leader. Finally, a
discussion of the monarch in the context of policy-making
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in a modernizing society is still relevant because for over
half of the present century, policy-making and the monarchy
in Iran have "been synonymous
.
As is true in all modernizing societies, there are
aspects of the Iranian political system which have remained
relatively unchanged throughout the centuries. Patrimonialism
remains the essence of a system which continues to be
characterized by rivalry and insecurity. Bargaining is still
the name of the political game in Iran, as the current crisis
has repeatedly demonstrated, and if anything, more deeply
permeates Iranian politics than ever before. In what was
the first modern study of the Iranian political system,
Professor Binder noted that "every wealthy family, every high
army or police officer, every mujtahid, every university
professor, every tribal khan, every high official, judge,
legal adviser, or accountant. . .labor leader, editor and
publisher, leaders of political parties, leading merchants...
leaders of interest of professional associations" are all
^7
engaged in bargaining. It is also a game which the last
Shah for many years was able to play with consumate skill by
creating "a dynamically stable balance of tension in which
ministers, courtiers, security agents, military leaders,
industrialists, and clerics are systematically divided








The traditional position and role of religion in Persian
society is another feature of that nation's heritage to emerge
relatively unscathed into the 20th century. Islam is still
the glue which binds most of the disparate forces together.
Because of the unique role Islam has played in Iran, however,
it has provided the patrimonial leader with an ideology that
"buttressed and strengthened the political patterns by which
he ruled." The recent Shah in particular attempted to use
religion as a "legitimizing device" by locking himself "into
the legitimizing tradition of the Imams and Shi' ism. ""'-'
Although the religious hierarchy was used to a certain degree
of competion with the monarchy over the question of "legiti-
macy via emanation," the delicate nature of their relationship
was upset when the Pavlavis first denied the ulema a voice
in policy-making and ultimately challenged the institutional
position of Islam itself in Iranian society by attempting
to transfer to secular institutions responsible only to the
monarch many of the social and economic functions tradition-
ally performed by the religious establishment. One
problem that contributed to widespread discontent was the
monarchy's failure to create viable secular institutions to
provide the services previously performed by religious organ-






See Donald N. Wilber. Reza Shah Pahlavi ; The Resurrection
and Reconstruction of Iran . (Hicksville, N.Y.: 1975), pp. 2^6
& 263; see also 3 ill, Politics of Iran , Chapter 6.
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ulema, but also the very members of society whose support it
sought by attempting such change in the first place: the
52
peasants, urban laborers, and the middle class.
One area of Iranian policy-making has undergone considerable
systemic change in the last 100 years. Under the two Pahlavi
Shahs, the position of the ruler acquired a degree of power
and authority whose totality was unrivaled in Persian history.
Although the Pahlavi reign was not without its leadership
crises--such as the abdication of Reza Shah in 19^1 and the
Mossadiq period from ±951-53--overa±l , the policy-making
function of the monarchy under the Pahlavis became increasingly
more absolute, arbitrary, and obtrusive. This increase in
the authority of the monarch was fostered, aside from the
forceful personalities of the Pahlavi rulers, by two separate
but equally crucial developments. First was the institution
of a standing military force, begun under Reza Shah but
greatly expanded by his successor-son, Mohammed Reza. By
forming a large and modern military the Pahlavi ' s were able
to break the traditional hold of the aristocracy and tribal
nobility on the throne by eliminating the monarchy's dependency
on levies from the tribes and local rulers. Reza Shah's
successful campaign to disarm the tribes also meant a cen-
tralization of coercive power in the hands of the ruler. His
success was limited, however, by the fact the Reza Shah
lacked sufficient financial resources to fully train and equip
J See James A. Bill, "Iran and the Crisis of '78," Foreign
Affairs
.




an army of sufficient size to pose a credible deterrence to
hostile external powers. Such a feat was accomplished by
Mohammed Reza, but only following the second systemic change:
greater control by the government over Iran's petroleum
resources
.
After WWII, Iran was able to gain both a greater voice
in the development of its burgeoning oil industry and a
greater share in that industry's profits. Following the
resolution of the internal crisis of 1953 in the monarchy's
favor, the use of that revenue became increasingly the
perrogative solely of the Shah. Iranian production grew
steadily during the 60 ' s , and along with expanded production
came increased petroleum revenue, particularly after the
founding of OPEC in 1960.-^ Control of Iranian oil revenue
meant that the Shah was increasingly able to pay for the
expansion and modernization of the military, thereby lessen-
ing, and by 1968 eliminating, his dependence on military aid
from external powers. This same period also witnessed a
further centralization and consolidation of royal authority
through the organization, in the wake of the Mossadiq
crisis, of an extensive intelligence and security apparatus
within both the government and the military. The State
Security and Intelligence Organization, SAVAK, and Iranian
-^See Robert B. Stobaugh, "The Evolution of Iranian Oil




Military Intelligence, Rokn-e do, were organized with
American and Israeli assistance. Thus the monarchy acquired
a total monopoly of coercive power within the state.
These changes— the development of a modern army and
growing oil revenue—meant that the traditional systemic
constraints on the authority of the ruler ceased to function.
No single group, class, or institution in Persian society was
able to effectively challenge the awesome power of the mon-
arch. Although bargaining and co-optation were still the
normative essence of Persian politics, increased reliance
on coercion and suppression of all opposition became more
frequent. -3 -? The monarch became virtually isolated from the
mainstream of society, believing that it was no longer
necessary to cooperate with the other members of the tradit-
ional elite, and that the monarchy's continued success could
be insured by merely preventing: (l) any cooperation between
opposition elements against the monarchy and its policies;
and, (2) any external support for would-be domestic opposition
groups. An increasing air of complacency apparently enveloped
the ruler and his advisors and gave them a growing but false
J See Zonis, p. 43, and Bill Politics of Iran , p. k2-, see
also Sharam Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, The Foreign Relations
of Iran (Berkeley: 197*0, p. 157.
-^For a graphic first-hand account of the scope and nature
of repression in Iran under the last Shah see Reza Baraheni
,
The Crowned Cannibals (New York: 1977), see also Bill, 'Iran
and the Crisis of '78," p. 328.
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sense of security. They assumed that their position was
unassailable due to: (l) the support for their position by
the majority of the people; and (2) the inconceivability of
any opposition coalition from any logical combination of
factions aligning itself against the government, since, as
history had shown, any such opposition would have to include
elements from both the religious establishment and the
secular (social democratic and marxist) opposition (who were
assumed by the government to be anathema one to the other)
,
together with representatives of the economic elite, the
middle class, urban labor, and mid-level bureaucrats and
military officers (whose loyalty was assumed by virtue of
their dependence on the government's success and continuity
for their individual livelihood.)-5
The above discussion is not meant to imply that the growth
of the army and the expansion of oil revenue were the only
aspects of modernization in Iran to impact on the policy-
making process. Certainly, other significant changes have
occurred. The development of a "new" or "professional-
bureaucratic" class as an outgrowth of the modernization
* See Bill, "Iran and the Crisis of '78," pp. 32^, 331-
33^; and his "Iran: Is the Shah pushing too fast?", Christian
Science Monitor
, 9 Nov. 77, pp. 18-19; see also Linda Witt's
interview with Marvin Zonis in People , 27 Nov 78; and Abul
Kasim Mansur, "The Crisis in Iran," Armed Forces Journal Inter -
national (January 1979), pp. 26-33; and Tony Allaway, "How the
Shah could fall so far so fast, ' The Christian Science
Monitor
. 22 Feb. 79, p. 23.
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process, including education as well as economic development,
was the subject of intense study by both Professors Bill and
Zonis. Similarly, changes have occured as to the makeup of
the Iranian elite, as a result of all of the factors men-
tioned above. Although social mobility has been enhanced,
not only has the actual size of the elite diminished over
time, but the members themselves no longer have "any claim
over the Shah. "-" The legendary "One Thousand Families,"
who were in times past regarded as the elite in Iran, have
given way to a broader-based but narrower elite which,
before the revolution, probably consisted of no more than
300-375 persons.
^
The effect both of those factors which have remained
relatively fixed over time and of the systemic political
changes themselves on the modern Iranian foreign policy-
making process is perhaps not as tangential as it might initially
appear. Regarding the relationship between the ruler and
policy-making, for instance, it should be apparent at this
point that, although the Persian ruler has traditionally
had a strong voice in foreign policy, which one source dates
back to the Mossadegh's overthrow in 1953 » the ruler and
foreign policy have become synonymous. Additionally the
57 Zonis, p. 127.
The lesser figure is from Zonis' study; the larger from
James A. Bill, "The Patterns of Elite Politics in Iran," in
Political Elite in the Middle East , ed. by George Lenczowski
(Washington: 1975). pp. 22-27.




the significance of the ruler's enchanced role in policy-
making is further magnified by a phenomenon inherent in
developing nation politics: the "intertwining in countries
like Iran [ofJ nearly all the vital policy decisions per-
taining to planning, development, and social welfare. . .with
60
defense and foreign policies." As a result, Mohammed Reza
Shah was not only able to "reserve" defense and foreign
affairs "for his sole jurisdiction," but other related
activities as well, such as oil policy, bureaucratic and
military appointments and promotions, monetary and fiscal
policy, and budgeting. For example, the Shah presided over
a committee known as the High Economic Council, an ad hoc
working group which was in fact the "highest policy-making
body which considers and formulates policies which come under
62
the category of mega-policies." Also included in the HEC
were the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister for
Economic Affairs, the Ministers of the Economy, Labor, and
Finance, the Director of the Plan Organization, and the
Governor of the Central Bank. One of the recent foreign
policy decisions in which this group is known to have played
a key role was the sale of natural gas to the Soviet Union. ^
60









Another recent ad hoc feature of Iranian policy-making
was the use by the last Shah of a group of personal advisors
who served as a sort of "Shadow Cabinet" providing the
monarch with information and advice on a wide range of
64
issues and policies, including foreign affairs. Foreign
and defense policy advisors to the Shah included several
foreign as well as Persian advisors and with such varied
backgrounds as education, journalism, intelligence, and
6
1
administration. -? Prominent Americans who regularly received
audiences with the Shah were former C.I. A. Director and U.S.
Ambassador to Iran Richard Helms, Berkeley Professor George
Lenczo wski , and Georgetown Center Director Dr. Alvin J.
Cottrell.
v
Although the "Shadow Cabinet" and the staff of
foreign advisors served as an important source of additional
information and as a larger sample of opinion, no apparent
attempt was made, in light of the recent revolution, by the
Shah to provide himself with divergent opinions on policy
issues as, for example, the U.S. President has done through






-'See Princess Soraya, The Autobiography of H.I.H. Princess
Sorava
.
trans, by Constantine Fitzgibbon. (London: 1963) , pp.
80-31.
66
Interview with Prof. George Lenczowski, Professor of
Political Science, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley,
California, April 1978, and interview with Dr. Alvin J. Cottrell,
Director, Georgetown University Center for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies, Washington, D.C., 20 April 1978.
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This chapter has attempted to formulate an analytical,
socio-cultural
, and political framework which will both serve
as a background to and a basis for the remainder of the
study. The following chapter will briefly explain the
essential characteristics of Russia's historical interest
in Iran, and a subsequent chapter will outline the historical
development of Russo-Persian relations through the Cold War
era. The final chapter will assess Iran's post-Cold War
policy toward the Soviet Union in light of certain specific
issues: detente, Britain's withdrawal from the Persian Gulf,
the Indo-Pakistani conflict, and political change in the
region. It was the intent of this initial chapter to discuss
those features of the fabric of Persian society with which
Iranian foreign policy has been and will continue to be
inherently imbued, thereby enabling a more culturally sensitive
approach to the subject.
*U

III. THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE: A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF
SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF/INDIAN
OCEAN REGION
In addition to analyzing recent developments in the
character and substance of Iranian foreign policy, this study
also deals with the impact of a more regionally active Iran
on Soviet foreign policy. Such an undertaking requires a
brief explanation of the historical, systemic, and environ-
mental determinants of Soviet policy in the region. The
Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region is an area of longstanding
strategic, political, and economic importance to Moscow, and
Iran has emerged in Soviet strategy as a focal point of
Kremlin interest in the region. This chapter, therefore,
will attempt to describe the evolution of Soviet policy
toward the area in terms of: (1) historical parallels between
Czarist and Soviet strategy; (2) the Soviet policy-making
process and its impact on formulation and implementation of
Kremlin policy objectives; (3) the inter-dependency between
Soviet regional -interests and its overall foreign policy;
and (4-) the impact of domestic political, economic, and
military constraints on Soviet policy. This framework should
provide a more ratio cinative basis for examining Soviet
involvement in the area than the traditional issue-area
approach employed in most studies of Soviet policy in the
^2

Middle East, such as those by Lenczowski, Klieman,
69 c , 70Laqueur, and Spector.
Present-day Soviet foreign policy is a product of Russian
historical experience. Russian strategy has tended to follow
a general pattern of expansion, consolidation and preservation.
Traditionally, there has also been a close relationship
between expansionist foreign policies and internal perceptions
71
of strategic vulnerability. Russian strategy under both
Czarist and Soviet regimes has focused on establishing either
physical control or political neutralization of the Eurasian
continent and attaining unrestricted access to contiguous
72
maritime areas. Russian expansionism also has coincided
with a perception of either military weakness, political
instability, or shifting strategic priorities in the capitals
73
of neighboring states. J Russian activism has been largely
67
''See George Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle
East (Washington, D.C.: 1972).
68See Aaron S. Klieman, Soviet Russia and the Middle East
(Baltimore, MD : 1970).
6g_
'See Walter J. Laqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East
(New York: 1969)
.
70See Ivar Spector, The Soviet Union and the Muslim World
1917-19 68 (Seattle, WA: 1959)
•
71 Roman Kolkowiz, "The Soviet Policy in the Middle East,"
in The U.S.S.R. and the Middle East
, ed. by Michael Gonfino
and Shimon Shamir (New York: 1973) > P- 77 •
72Lenczowski, Soviet Advances. .
, p. 2.




dependent on its own momentum for success , or as one source
notes, "a case of enormous power looking for a purpose.'"
Few nations on earth have been more attune to the nature of
Russian strategy than Iran, as for centuries Iran served
first as an objective of Russian ambition and later as a
battleground on which a consistent struggle for regional
supremacy between Russia and the other great powers was
waged.
A. TRADITIONAL RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN IRAN
Unlike the West, which traditionally has been more
concerned with the Eastern Mediterranean littoral as the
strategic hub of the Middle East, Russian historical interest
has centered on its souther rimland, or as it is known in
7 5
the West, on the Northern Tier. v Because of this region's
contiguity with the Russian heartland, it has been an area
of greater interest to Russia than the Arab speaking
nations to the south and west. Iran itself was located on
a vital East-West crossroad linking Europe with India and
the Far East. Furthermore, its dominant position on the
Persian Gulf to the south linked Iran to the larger Arabian
Sea and Indian Ocean. Russian Czars appreciated and coveted




-Uvo J. Lederer, "Historical Introduction," in The Soviet
Union and the Middle East , ed. by Ivo J. Lederer and Wayne S.




of the Persians to both Indian and Chinese trade.
Similarly, given their inability throughout history to gain
entree to the warm waters of the Mediterranean, the Persian
Gulf became increasingly inviting, particularly given the
comparatively weaker position of Persia via a vis the Turks
and the Europeans. At various times, Russia considered
efforts to gain access to several Persian ports on the Gulf,
77including Bashehr, Bandar Abbas and Chah Bahar.
A second aspect of traditional Russian interest in Iran
and the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region as a whole was socio-
cultural. The peoples who inhabited the vast stretches of
Central Asia from the Black Sea in the west' to the Hindu
Kush in the east were neither Slavs nor were they Christians
as were the Russians. Rather the region was host to a myriad
of ethnic, linguistic, and socio-cultural groups, including
several groupings of Turkic, Indo-European, and Mongol peoples
Most of these peoples, moreover, had been at one time or
another converted to I siam- -a powerful socio-cultural force
with, as was explained earlier, strong political implications.
The dynamic characteristics of Islam meant that the Central
Asiatics had very real ties with the three Islamic empires on
76
For an indication of Czarist intentions in the region
see the discussion of, and excerpts from, Peter the Great's
legendary will, in Sir Percy M. Sykes , A History of Persia
,
Vol. II, 3rd ed. (New York: 1969)
.
p. 2^5.
77Kazemzadeh, pp. 201, 219, 333, 3^0, '-±67-^70, and ^88.
1^5

Russia's southern periphery: Persia, Ottoman Turkey, and
Moghul India. This condition troubled the Czars, who were
at the same time challenged by an urge to civilize the
region--out of a sense of missionary zeal--as well as a
political and military need to occupy what they perceived as
a strategic "vacuum, " waiting to be filled by any great
78
power that could get there with a sizeable military force.
On the other hand, Russia felt threatened by the existing
condition of tribalism combined with religious zenophobia
which could be manipulated by the Islamic empires further
south, or through them, by a hostile European power.
A final rationale for traditional Russian interest in
the region was as a reaction to the demonstrated irrterest
of other great powers in the area. Russia perceived
increasing Western (British, French, and German) interest
in the region as a potential threat to its security. With
the rise of British power in India in the 18th and 19th
centuries, Russia's general anxiety assumed more specific
dimensions. As the British subsequently not only solidified
their position in India, but also were able to extend their
influence both across the Indus into Afghan territory as well
as in Iran and the Persian Gulf area, Russia responded both
diplomatically and militarily with actions designed to at
least retard, if not halt, any further extension of British
78_See Howard M. Hensel, "Soviet Policy in the Persian
Gulf," unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of




influence in the region. Caught in the middle of this
centuries-long confligration--which included every aspect
of international relations from diplomacy to various
economic mechanisms to intrigue to actual armed conflict--
was Iran.
Russian involvement in the area evolved through three
79
relatively distinct phases. From approximately the middle
of the l6th century until I876 Russia pushed South expanding
its territorial holdings in the Caucasus and later in
Central Asia proper. Russian strategy during this period
was designed to stabilize the frontier by decreasing both the
threat of invasion--i. e. from Ottoman, Persian, and British-
Indian forces--and the parallel risk of insurrection by non-
Russian peoples in the area who might be sympathetic with
these anti-Russian forces. Russian policy during this period
relied primarily on military conquest for its implementation,
with subversion and economic exploitation increasing in both
frequency and importance during later years.
After the conquest of Central Asia, St. Petersburg
largely abandoned its expansionist strategy and concentrated
on consolidating its control over the newly acquired terri-
tories. As well as strengthening its own imperial position
in the area, Russia also sought to neutralize further any
threat from adjacent territories by preventing their use by
79Kolkowicz, in Confino and Shamir, p. 62.
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rival European powers seeking to take advantage of the
enfeebled Ottoman and Persian empires.
B. SOVIET STRATEGY VIS A VIS IRAN SINCE 1917
Following the October revolution, the resultant civil
war in Russia tended to de-emphasize the significance of
foreign affairs and external strategy in Bolshevik planning.
One policy from the Czarist period which the Bolsheviks
continued to emphasize was the prevention of any ascendancy
of a hostile power along its southern flank. Following the
October revolution, Britain launched three military campaigns
into southern Russia: (1) in Transcaucasia, a force under
Dunsterville arrived in Baku via Iran in order to: (a) organ-
ize a local defense against invading German and Turkish armies,
and (b) following the termination of hostilities, provide
support to White Russian forces operating in the area; (2) in
Transcaspia, British and Indian forces under Major General
Malleson occupied Askhabad, using it as a base of operations
against the Tashkent Red Army; and (3) in Turkestan, an
expedition under Sir George Macartney proceeded via Sinkiang
to Tashkent in order to assess and, if possible, support
anti-Bolshevik forces in that region. Although the British
government cancelled its anti-Bolshevik operations and with-
drew its forces in 1919. the Bolshevik regime was extremely
concerned with scope of anti-regime activity and general
instability in the area. As the next chapter will demonstrate,




I were aimed more at achieving a "Findlandization" of the
region than a physical annexation of territory.
Under the current regime, the Soviet Union has pursued a
policy designed to preserve what Moscow regards as its
legitimate interests in the area. Similar in several
respects to the Western policy applied toward the Soviets
after World War II, the Kremlin's objectives in the area
include "containing" and "rolling back" Western influence
without provoking an actual superpower confrontation. Where
possible Moscow's tactics include fostering the rise of
friendly regimes by supporting local progressive movements
when it is determined that such groups have a reasonable
chance of success. The Kremlin's strategy is also designed
to establish and maintain access to regional resources while
simultaneously limiting Western access. In addition,
80
As defined by Prof. Vernon Aspaturian in an advanced
seminar on Soviet foreign policy conducted at the Naval Post-
graduate School during the Spring Quarter 1978 > "Finlandization"
is a term applied to attempts by the Soviet Union to create
,
along its periphery, buffer states which, while being tech-
nically neutral--! » e . they are not members of any defensive
alliance--are in reality politically subservient to and
economically dependent on Moscow. Willingness of a country
to accept such an arrangement together with the absence of
any significant military threat to the Soviet Union from the
area eliminates the necessity for stationing Soviet troops in
the country. The only country to date where such a condition
exists is Finland, however, Soviet activities in Asia and the
Middle East indicate that the Kremlin may have a similar
operative strategy in portions of those areas—particularly
in Iran, Afghanistan, and South-East Asia--and possibly, as
a long-range objective, in Turkey and Pakistan as well.
4.9

Soviet objectives aim at preventing any penetration of the
region by its ideological rival, the People's Republic of
China.
Such a strategy emerged as a result of the failure of
Moscow's confrontation policy of the Cold War years. This
policy not only failed to accomplish Soviet objectives, but
along the southern periphery served in fact to propel Turkey,
Iran, and Pakistan into a formal anti-Soviet alliance. The
present regime, however, has employed a more cautious approach,
emphasizing the "carrot" (political support, economic aid, and
military assistance) rather than the "stick."
For its part Iran is particularly aware of the success
of Moscow's current strategy in the region. Under the Shah's
rule, Iran perceived that the success of the Kremlin's
policies had been enhanced by several related factors con-
cerning the West's position in the area, including: (l) the
American debacle in South East Asia; (2) a perceived move on
the part of the U.S. toward a neo-isolationist policy (as
evidenced by U.S. inaction in Angola, Ethiopia, and Afgan-
istan) ; and (3) a general erosion of the western alliance
in the wake of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. the oil
Q-l
embargo of 197^ > and the Cyprus crisis of that same year.
O-T
See William E. Griffith, "Iran's Foreign Policy in the
Pahlavi Era" in Lenczowski's Iran Under the Pahlavi's
, p. 376;
also Shahram Chubin, "Iran's Foreign Policy 1960-1976: An Over-
view," in Twentieth Century Iran , ed. by Hossein Amirsadeghi
(New York: 1977), p. 201; and Daniel Southerland, "Afghan coup
generates wait-and-see reaction," Christian Science Monitor
,
9 May 1978, p. 5; information also based on interview with Dr.
Assad Homayoun, Political Officer, Embassy of Iran, Washington,
D.C.
, 21 April 1978.
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Iran also recognized that the area offers "classic"
opportunities for Soviet involvement due to the region's
inherent instability, severe social and economic disequili-
bration, and nationalist euphoria. Its proximity, hostility
to a Western protege (Israel) , and vast petroleum deposits
go
further enhance its value to the Soviets.
In recent years economic considerations have assumed
greater significance in Moscow's relationship with Iran and
the Middle East. Soviet industrial growth—the key to progress
in all sectors of the Soviet economy, especially modernization
of the defense sector--is inextricably linked to the need
for increased supplies of oil for domestic consumption.
Satisfying future demands through additional domestic pro-
duction involves a level of financial investment and
technological expertise which the Soviets appear unable or
unwilling to incur. At least until the recent revolution in
Iran effectively dried up the supply glut on the world
petroleum market, Moscow imported about 15 MMT of oil annually
from the Middle East. In several instances, the Soviets
found that they could import oil cheaper than they could
increase domestic exploitation of Siberian reserves, due to
the prohibitive costs and technological requirements of ex-
ploration, production, and transportation of petroleum under
such climatic extremes. J Another aspect of this problem
Q o
See Kolkowicz, in Confino and Shamir, p. 82.
%. D. McLaurin. The Middle East in Soviet Policy .
(Lexington, MA: 1975), p. 5^.
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is that Moscow is forced to export large quantities of oil
in order to obtain desperately needed hard currency. In
fact, oil is today the largest foreign exchange earner among
Soviet exports. Because current projections indicate that
"by 1980 internal production will not meet Soviet and COMECON
needs, unimpaired access to Middle Eastern oil becomes a
84political as well as economic necessity for the Kremlin.
As will be discussed in more detail later, access to Iranian
and other Middle Eastern petroleum supplies was made possible
by Moscow's post-Cold War rapprochement with both Iran and
Turkey.
C. MOSCOW'S IRANIAN POLICY: SYSTEMIC DETERMINANTS
1. The Policy-Making Process
The desire by Moscow to develop a more pragmatic and
flexible regional policy which could respond advantageously
to the sudden changes endemic to the Middle East required that
structural changes be implemented in the Kremlin's vast
amorphous decision-making apparatus. Perhaps the most im-
portant change which subsequently evolved was the development
and use of regional and functional ad hoc committees. D
Where crucial issues or geographic areas are concerned, such
as energy policy and the Middle East, these committees
84Institute for the Study of Conflict. Soviet Objectives
in the Middle East . (London: 197*0, P- 24.
8 ^
-^Matthew P. Gallagher and Karl F. Spielman Jr. Soviet
Decision-Making for Defense . (New York: 1972), p. 29.
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probably assume a degree of permanence. Members are drawn
from key ministries, departments of the Central Committee
of the CPSA, and the Party Secretariat plus experts from
appropriate agencies of the Academy of Science. Noted
journalists may even at times be called upon for advice and
recommendations. The staffing of the committee is normally
co-ordinated by the International Department of the Central
Committee. Area studies, background information, and
analyses of special situations of interest to the ad hoc
committee are provided by the regional institutes of the
Academy of Science.
Exact membership of the ad hoc committee on the Middle
East is unknown, and in fact the membership probably
fluctuates depending on the situation, issue, or country
being discussed at any given meeting. It is known that the
Middle East committee is chaired by no less a personage than
Soviet Premier Alexi Kosygin, the Politburo's resident expert
87
on the region. Kosygin' s deputy on the committee is most
likely Boris Ponomarev, head of the International Department
and a non-voting member of the Politburo , in keeping with
Soviet policy of having party functionaries supervising
professional bureaucrats. Representing the Foreign Ministry's
86
Vladimir Petrov, "Formation of Soviet Foreign Policy,"
Orbis, 17 (Fall, 1973). P- 832.
'U.S. Department of the Army. U.S.S.R.; Analytical




interests would probably be Victor Minin, the chief of that
ministry's Middle East Department. The Ministry of Defense
would be well represented on the committee, including one
of the Deputy Ministers such as General Pavlovskiy or
Admiral Gorshkov, both members of the Central Committee who
have been frequent visitors to the area. Also from the
Defense Ministry would be representatives of the Directorate
for Military Assistance and the Fourth (Middle East)
Directorate of the GRU. Also representing the intelligence
community would be a member of the Eighth (Middle East)
Department of the First (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate
of the KGB. Again depending on the nature of a particular
session, other agencies with likely representation would be
the Ministry of Petroleum Industry, the Ministry of Petroleum
Refining and Petrochemical Industry, the Ministry of Trade,
and the Committee for Foreign Economic Relations. Prominent
journalists who specialize on the Middle East such as G.
Mirskiy and I. Beliaev, and noted Iranian scholars from the
Oriental Institute such as M. S. Ivanov and I. I. Korobeiniko
,
probably provide information and advice to the committee from
time to time.
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See Wayne S. Vucinich, "Soviet Studies on the Middle
East," in Lederer and Vucinich, p. 227, and Paul Cocks, "The
Policy Process and Bureaucratic Politics," in The Dynamics
of Soviet Politics , ed. by Paul Cocks, R.V. Daniels, and N. V.
Heer (Cambridge, Mass.: 1976).
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It must be recognized that the committee described
above does not "make" the Kremlin's Middle Eastern or
Iranian policy. Its primary role is to supervise the
implementation of Soviet foreign policy by the various re-
sponsible organs of the So.vet bureaucracy. The committee
can, and undoubtedly does, make policy recommendations, but
the ultimate responsibility for determining Soviet foreign
policy, and the ultimate decision-making authority, is the
Politburo of the CPSU.
2. The International Environment
Moscow describes the international political system
in terms of six interdependent sub-systems: (1) relations
among socialist countries; (2) relations between socialist
countries and the Third World; (3) relations between socialist
and imperialist countries; (^) relations among Third World
countries; (5) relations between Third World and imperialist
On
countries; and (6) relations among imperialist countries.
Although Bolshevik strategy initially emphasized the importance
of carrying the communist banner into colonial nations as the
best means of causing a communist revolution within the
imperialist states, this scheme was largely abandoned
following the death of Lenin. With the exception of China,
Stalin was primarily concerned with domestic problems and Euro-
pean affairs. As a result, Soviet foreign policy during this
period was : out of tune" with the realities of world politics,
89William Zimmerman. Soviet Perspectives on International
Relations
. 1956-1967. (Princeton, N.J. : 1969) , pp. 2^-2^5.
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including the rise of consciousness and nationalistic
feelings in the Third World. Such rigid policies and
dogmatic thinking meant that Stalin's successors were forced
to react to the inevitable changes taking place in the
90international environment.
In contrast to Stalin's conservative and rather paranoid
foreign policy, Khrushchev's approach was adventuresome and
risky. Believing an arms race with the West to be an exercise
in futility—since any demonstrable ability to employ nuclear
weapons, regardless of how limited, would serve as an effective
deterrent—Khruschev set about establishing coexistence with
the West while simultaneously turning to the Third World as
the new arena for East-West competition. He disavowed the
"two-camp" theory, arguing that a third area, or "zone of
peace" would enable developing countries to achieve socialism
91through non-violent means. He advocated support for "wars
of national liberation" and for all "patriotic forces" who
92
were anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist. In a speech
to the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961 Khruschev announced,
"the CPSU considers fraternal alliance with all peoples who
have thrown off colonial tyranny to be a cornerstone of its
90Paul Marantz, "Internal Politics and Soviet Foreign
Policy," Western Political Quarterly , No. 28 (March 1975),
p. 132.









93international policy. "^ Khruschev's demise was the result
of ambitions which exceeded his capability to implement and
support.
Brezhnev has replaced his predecessor's idiosyncratic
brand of leadership with a style which relies on a firm
consensus among Politburo members and a foreign policy which
exhibits a considerably lower international profile. By 1969
Brezhnev had apparently realized that catching up economically
9 ^
with the U.S. was, in the short run, impossible. J Con-
sequently he emphasized the importance of detente with the
West, while in the Third World, re-oriented Soviet foreign
policy towards effecting improved relations with those states
on the periphery on the Eurasian heartland. This shift was
the result of several factors including the rise in Chinese
power, Soviet failures in Africa and Latin America, and
opportunities for expanding Russian influence in the Middle
East and Asia. The objectives of the Brezhnev regime apparently
include stable relations with the West, political caution and
military preparedness vis a vis China, and flexibility in




Kolkowicz, in Confino and Shamir, p. 78.
-VoIfgang Leonhard, "The Domestic Politics of the New
Soviet Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs , Vol. 52 (Fall 1975),
p. 66.
96Kolkowicz, in Confino and Shamir, p. 80.
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Brezhnev willing to forego policy objectives which he perceives
to be in Soviet national interest in order to preserve the
U.S. image of detente.
One aspect of traditional Russian foreign policy which was
initially incorporated by Lenin and has recently re-emerged
under the Brezhnev regime is the concept of linkages between
Soviet policy objectives in one region and its strategy in
another. Like the Czars and Lenin, the present regime links
its policy in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean sub-region with
its policies both in the Eastern Mediterranean/Arab World
and in East Asia. Furthermore, Moscow's current strategy
in the Third World is in turn tied to Kremlin policies toward
the West and China. In recent years the present Kremlin
leadership has demonstrated its intention of using the Third
World as an arena in which timely diplomatic, economic, and
military measures can be employed to: (1) stabilize Moscow's
relationship with both Washington and Peking; (2) protect
Soviet interests in areas of vital concern to the Kremlin,
such as the Eastern Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and East
Asia; and (3) enhance Moscow's prestige with the developing
nations. In this manner, the Brezhnev regime can respond
more readily to regional and global events, taking advantage
of perceived weaknesses in the policies or resolve of its
adversaries, and limiting the effects of adverse environmental




An analysis of the entire complex realm of various
economic, political, and military constraints on Soviet
foreign policy is beyond the scope of this study, therefore,
this section will only highlight the most important issues
which impacted on Soviet relations with Iran and the Middle
East in general. Moscow's regional strategy has exacerbated
several domestic problems. Primarily these problems have
been economic, and the result has been a growing fear among
the leadership that they will foster increased internal
unrest. Soviet industry stagnates under inefficient manage-
ment, Russian agriculture is only 1/6 as productive as its
American counterpart, and vital natural resources lie untapped
due to the lack of additional capital to invest and in adequate
technology.
Given the Kremlin's limited ability or willingness to
divert financial, technological, and manpower resources from
the dominant defense sector into the agricultural and light
industry sectors, accurately assessing the real economic cost
of programs where resources might be diverted, such as foreign
aid, becomes a critical appraisal for Soviet leaders. One
source estimates that from 195^-1976 Soviet foreign economic
aid totalled over $7-3 billion. Over 63% of this, $4.6
, .
07
oillion, went to countries in the Middle East. ' The impact
97
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of this program on the Soviet economy in terms of diverted
resources, capital investment etc. is probably significantly
greater than would be a similar program in the U.S. Although
most of this aid went to Arab countries and not to Iran,
advocates of foreign assistance in the Kremlin frequently
find themselves opposed by a vociferous coalition of consumer,
agricultural, and public service interests who would prefer
to see the Soviet Union court those Middle Eastern and Third
World nations who, like Iran, can pay for Soviet goods with
either hard currency or with currency-earning products like
petroleum rather than spending such vast amounts on aid
projects to nations whose ability to repay Moscow is question-
ed
able at best. As a result the Kremlin, since the October
War, has begun to place more emphasis on economic ties with
the more solvent states in the region, including Iran, Iraq,
and Libya. The Soviets have been receiving natural gas from
Iran since 1966 and have also purchased about 2MMT of oil per
99year from the Iranians since 1973*
Soviet defense expenditures have been almost as hotly
debated in Moscow as they have been by Western Kremlinologists
The need for an adequate capability to project Soviet power
into distant areas while simultaneously maintaining a credible
strategic deterrent given the constraints of limited resources
98See McLaurin, p. 5^«
99Robert W. Campbell, "Some Issues in Soviet Energy Policy
for the Seventies," Middle East Information Series , No. 26/27
(Spring/Summer 197*0, p. 99.
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is a dilemma which has faced Soviet policy-makers since World
War II. Stalin was forced to curtail Soviet activities in
post-war Greece in part due to his inability to provide
necessary operational support to the local communist move-
ment. In 1956 Moscow was powerless to prevent the Anglo-
French operation against its newly acquired Arab protege,
Egypt. The Lebanese crisis of that same year, the Congo
crisis in i960, and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 all
pointed to significant shortcomings in Soviet military cap-
abilities. At some point in time during this sequence of
setbacks
—
possibly as early as 1956 but certainly no later
than 1962— a decision was made to commit the resources
necessary for the development of a military capability to
support distant operations.
Since his rise to power in 1964, President Brezhnev has
been an active proponent of heavy defense spending on con-
ventional forces. Particular attention has been to the
development of adequate airlift and amphibious capabilities
102
which can support Soviet involvement in the Third World.
The importance of a "blue-water" navy was recognized, although
it has been designed as a vehicle for supporting political
C. G. Jacobsen. Soviet Strategy—Soviet Foreign Policy
(Glasgow: 1972), p. 124.
Robert H. Donaldson, "Global Power Relationships in the







objectives rather than as an offensive military force. -*
By 1970 the Soviets had established a credible force with
strategic mobility, a force which Moscow did not hesitate
104
to employ in the October War, in Angola, and in Ethiopia.
Although the Kremlin has acquired a significant network of
shore support facilities in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean
area, it does not have any bases per se there. ~) Further-
more, the Soviets have neither deployed an Indian Ocean fleet
nor have they in fact maintained combatants in significant
numbers in the area except during crisis situations.
As the above discussion has attempted to demonstrate,
the modern Soviet state has translated traditional imperial
adventurism into a sort of dynamic internationalism, consisting
of leadership of the socialist world, cooperation with "pro-
gressive forces" in the developing countries, and active
competition with the capitalist world. It is a long-range
policy which can be characterized as flexible, opportunistic,
and pragmatic. Soviet foreign policy is capable of exploiting
"favorable conditions" or deviating from established pro-
107
cedures "to achieve specific goals." ' This is partly a





-A. base, as defined here, is any territory over which the
occupier has legal jurisdiction. Soviet facilities in India,
Iraq, and PDRY are part of an indigenous military installation
under local jurisdiction. Continued Soviet use of the facilities
is at the discretion of the host country.
i n ^
A. Voronov, "Aims of Soviet Foreign Policy," Soviet
Military Review , No. 3 (March 197*0, p. ^8.
107Hannes Adomeit, "Soviet Policy in the Middle Fast:
Problems of Analysis," Soviet Studies , 27 (April 1975), p. 295.
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process itself, which consists of interactions between
leaders who represent various personal and institutional
interests, thereby allowing for a continual shifting and
re-alignment of the consensual basis on which policies are
108
made.
As far as Moscow's policy toward Iran in particular is
concerned, it appears that the importance of Iran and the
Persian Gulf region in Soviet strategy was re-emphasized
following the October War and the subsequent decline in Soviet-
Arab relations. Moscow apparently believes that the region is
ripe for change , but is undoubtedly aware that change in this
area can be a double-edged sword. When "progressive forces"
serve as the vanguard of change, Kremlin interests are well
served, as was the case in Afghanistan. However, the Soviets
also realize that when the agents of change represent traditinal
interests, as in Iran, the results are more ambiguous and the
implications for Moscow of such change are less certain. This
attitude apparently accounts for the Soviets ' current wait-
and-see policy in Iran. Some elements within the Kremlin
hierarchy are undoubtedly concerned about the potential spill-
over effect of the Islamic revolution in Iran into other
areas of Soviet interest in the region such as Iraw,
Afghanistan, Syria, and the PDRY, and among the Soviet Union's





It has been the intent of these first two chapters to
establish a more structured analytical framework for this
study of Iranian-Soviet relations. It is a primary con-
tention of this study that a purely historical analysis can
not adequately address such aspects as attitudes, perceptions,
bureaucratic mechanisms, and various constraints, all of which
are essential features in the development of any nation's
foreign policy. With these first two chapters serving as
such a framework, the subsequent two chapters will scrutinize
specific issues and events in Iran's ^00-year relationship
with the Russians in an effort to understand: (1) how and why
certain historical events molded the image patterns of
Iranians toward Russia; and (2) current Iranian foreign policy
as a reflection of those historically ingrained perceptions.
6^

IV. THE RAPE OF" PERSIA; THE" HISTORICAL IMPERATIVE OF
IRANIAN POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA
Current Iranian policy toward the Soviet Union is, in
large part, an outgrowth of over 350 years of cumulative
Persian experience with Imperial Russia. During this era--
which was characterized "by a southward expansion, at Persia's
expense, of the Russian empire from the mid-l6th through the
latter 19th century--Persia was persistently victimized by
Russian aggression, exploitation, and intimidation. In the
process Persia lost about l/3 of its territorial holdings
and was forced to acceed to numerous humiliating and degrading
Russian demands for political and economic concessions.
Lacking the requisite military strength necessary to prevent
Russian expansionism, particularly during the latter years
of the period, Iran attempted to appeal to Britain's natural
concern with the impact of the Russian threat to Iran on
British interests in the region as a check on Russian terri-
torial ambition. Although Persian rulers had only limited
success in manipulating the Anglo-Russian rivalry, the
resultant experience has provided modern Iranian policy-
makers with significant insight into the intricacies of
Russian motivation, intentions, and policy-making in the
region.
A. RUSSIAN EXPANSION TOWARD THE PERSIAN GULF: 1551-1876
Iran's first experience with Russian ambitions in Central
Asia came not long after the founding of the Safavid dynasty in
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Iran and the Muscovite state in Russia. During the mid-l6th
century the forces of Ivan IV moved south in an effort to
subdue the Tartars of Kazan, Astrakhan, and the Crimea and
thereby eliminate the threat from continual Tartar raids
into the heart of Russia. Following a five-year campaign
from 1551-1556f Russia conquered Kazan and annexed Astrakhan,
located at the mouth of the Volga River on the Caspian Sea.
When a subsequent Tartar counter-offensive failed, Russia
mounted a drive to break the back of Tartar resistance by
pushing deep into Caucasia. Russian troops penetrated the
Caucasus for the first time in 1560 pursuing Tartar forces
into Daghestan, an area of nominal Persian sovereignty.
Russian timing proved excellent as the Persian forces of
Shah Tahmasp, the second Safavi Shah, were hastily retreating
from a more powerful onslaught, the army of Suleiman the
Magnificent which was itself pushing east out of Anatolia
into Azerbaijan. Shah Tahmasp was replaced in 158? by Shah
Abbas, the greatest of the Safavid monarchs , who first having
halted an Uzbeck offensive in Transoxiana, launched a cam-
paign to regain Azarbaijan which lasted until his death in
1629 » by which time the region had been returned to Persian
rule. For their part, the Russians were neither desirous of
being caught in the middle of an Ottoman-Persian war nor were
they fully capable of securing and maintaining their tenuous
hold over the rebellious Daghestani ' s . When the Czar's army
became involved in a more fruitful campaign against the
Baltic states in the last decade of the century, the Russian
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forces in Daghestan withdrew. A permanent Russian "presence
in the Caucasus was not established for another century and
a quarter.
Recognizing the significance of this three-pronged
external threat to Persian territorial integrity and political
independence, Shah Abbas undertook several actions designed
to both improve Persia's military preparedness and reduce
the scope of the threat. For example, armed Kurdish tribes-
men were relocated from Kurdistan to Khorasan to bolster
Persian defenses in the northeast against the Uzbek threat.
More importantly, Persia's tribal-based army was revamped.
Drawing on the military resources of the seven prominent
Turkish tribes in Azerbaijan—the Shambu , Ustajhi, Tekelu,
Afshar, Qajar, and Zulqader--Shah Abbas created a new "tribe,"
the "Shah-Sevan," on whose allegiance and soldiers the Shah
109
was better able to rely. Shah Abbas also established
Persia's first links with the European powers, including in
1622, a pact with the British for sharing control of the
Persian Gulf. 110
Persia in the early 18th century was at the nadir of
Safavid dynastic rule which, although in existence for over
200 years, had been in a state of atrophy since the death
of Shah Abbas in 1636. The coup de grace was performed
in 1722 by the Afghan conqueror Mahmud who overthrew the
109^See Pio Filippani-Ronconi , "The Tradition of Sacred
Kingship in Iran," in Iran Under the Pahlavis , ed. by George
Lenczowski (Stanford: 1978) , p. 79.
Donald N. Wilber. Iran: Past and Present . 8th ed.
(Princeton, N.J. : 1976), p. 79.
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last Safavid Shah, Sultan Hussein. Once again Russia
waisted no time in exploiting such an inviting opportunity.
Under the direction of Russia's most famous conqueror,
Peter the Great, Russian forces again penetrated the
Caucasus, quickly capturing Derbend, Baku, Astarabad,
Mazandaran , and Gilan. Unable to prevent the Russian
advance but equally unwilling to witness the dismemberment
of the Persian nation, Tahmasp Mirza, a son of the last
Shah, negotiated an agreement with Peter's emissaries
whereby Persia agreed to acquiesce to the Russian conquests
in return for Russian support in ousting the Afghans and
restoring the Safavi throne. Meanwhile Peter had signed an
agreement with Istanbul recognizing the Porte's claims
in Azerbaijan, and in 1727 Ottoman forces occupied most of
Western Iran including Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Hamadan, and
Kermanshah. Like the proverbial best-laid plans of mice
and men, the Russians, Tahmasp Mirza, and the Ottomans
were soon to be collective^ disappointed when a Persian army
commander, Nadir Quli Afshar of Khurasan, not only rallied
the Persian forces and defeated the Afghans in 1729, but
also set out to reconquer the territories captured by Russia
and the Ottomans. Furthermore, Nadir opted to rule Iran
himself rather than to restore the throne to the effete
Safavi' s. Nadir's forces regained Mazandaran and Gilan in
1732. In the Caucasus, Persian troops recaptured Shiravan,
Ibid.
, pp. ^2-45 passim.
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Ganja, Tiflis, and Erivan. Persia's three-year Caucasian
campaign ended with the Treaty of Ganja, in which Russia
withdrew from all remaining Caucasian territory, including
Derbend and Baku.. Nadir Shah's simultaneous Turkish
offensive was successfully concluded in 1736.
Any further Persian advance was forestalled by the
assassination of Nadir Shah in 17^7 • His Afshar successors
continued to rule in Khorasan until 1796, while southern
Iran was ruled by a Zand tribal chief tan from Shiraz.
Following Nadir Shah's assassination, the situation in
northwestern Iran quickly degenerated into disorder and
chaos as various tribes vied for control. Ultimately a
khan of the Qajar tribe gained control and in 1779 estab-
lished his headquarters in Tehran. Meanwhile the Christian
Georgians, who had long chafed under Muslim rule, seized the
opportunity to declare their independence from Persia. In
1783 Georgia's ruler, Keraclius, signed a pact with Catherine
the Great, who had not only been watching developments in
Iran with considerable interest, but who had also ordered
the Russian army to capture the Crimea from the waning
Ottomans. Like her predecessors, however, Catherine under-
estimated the tenacity and determination of the Persians.
The Qajar forces of Aqha Muhammed Shah marched on Georgia
and subsequently occupied Erivan, Shisha, Ganja, and Tiflis,
massacring substantial numbers of Georgians in the process.





With the accession of Alexander to the Romanov throne,
Qajar control of the northwestern territories was again
threatened. In 1801 Alexander unilaterally annexed Georgia
while his army captured the Georgian capital of Erivan and
occupied portions of Armenia and Azerbaijan as well. Persia
was slow to respond to the Russian encroachment due to a
lack of resources and the poor condition of its military
forces. Meanwhile Fath Ali Shah was negotiating with the
French for aid. An alliance was eventually signed in 1807
between Persia and France in which the Shah was assured that
Napoleon would launch an invasion of India via Russia
thereby eliminating the Russian threat to Persia. Unfort-
unately for Persia
,
Napoleon was unable to keep his bargain,
and in 1812 a rejeuvenated Russian army defeated the Persians
at the Battle of Aslandoz.
The war in the Caucasus officially ended with the
signing of the Treaty of Golistan in 1813* According to
the terms of the treaty, Russia acquired Georgia, Daghestan
(including Derbend and Baku) , and Karabagh and Shaki in
Azerbaijan. Persia also ceded to St. Petersburg the exclusive
right to maintain warships on the Caspian Sea. Undoubtedly
the most onerous of the treaty's stipulations, however, was
the fourth article which granted Russia the right "to
recognize the /Persian^ Prince who shall be nominated heir-
112
apparent." By requiring that the Shah of Iran obtain
112Jacob C. Hurewitz. Diplomacy in the Near and Middle
East
, Vol. 1 (Princeton, N. J. : 1956) , p. 85.
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Russian concurrence for the investiture of the Crown Prince,
Alexander obtained for himself and his progeny a "useful
instrument for direct interference in Iran's internal
113
affairs." J Not only did the treaty insure Russian control
of the eastern flank of the Black Sea, it also provided for
"strong political influence in Persia" and established a
strong Russian presence "in the vicinity of Indian," factors
11^
which received considerable attention m London.
Given the untenable nature of the terms of the Treaty of
Golistan for Iran, further conflict with Russia was virtually
inevitable. Hostilities broke out again in 1825 over a
dispute involving jurisdiction over the district of Gakcha
in Armenia. Path Ali Shah's forces were again no match for
the Russians. Under the command of General Ivan Paskevich,
Alexander's army defeated the Persians at the Battle of
Shamkar in 1826 and occupied Erivan, Nakhichevan, Abbasabad,
and Tabriz. According to the provisions of the subsequent
Treaty of Turkomanchai, which has been called "the most
humiliating treaty Iran ever signed," -* Persia acquiesced
to Russian retention of Erivan and Nakhichevan and agreed
to an indemnity payment of 20,000,000 roubles. Furthermore,
113^Firuz Kazemzadeh. Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864- -
191^





^Rouhallah Ramazani. The Foreign Policy of Iran, 1500 -
19^1 . (Charlottesville, VA; 1966), p. 4-6.
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a commercial protocol appended to the treaty granted
several concessions to Russian merchants and consular
officials. 116
Russian territorial ambition in Central Asia was not
limited to the Caucasus. At first St. Petersburg induced
Persia into attempting the reconquest of Persian territory
lost to the Afghans, particularly the city of Herat, thereby
probing the British defenses in India. Persian attempts to
that effect by both Muhammad Shah and his son Nasr al-Din
Shah failed. Following their defeat in the Crimea, the
Russians determined to succeed where the Persians had failed
and fill what they perceived as a "power vacuum" extending
117
"from Siberia to the Hindu Kush." In a campaign which
lasted from I865 until I876, a desert force under Generals
Kaufman and Skobelev was dispatched by Alexander II to subdue
the tribal khanates of Central Asia, including areas once
a part of the Persian Empire. By 1866 Bukhara, Tashkent, and
Samarkand in Turkistan had fallen. The campaign was carried
to Transcaspia and Turkmenistan in I869 » the latter of which
proved inconclusive except for the fall of Khiva in 1873*
After the capture of Khiva, the Russians pushed east into the
Firgana Valley and Tadjikistan with Kokand falling in I876.
Count Dimitri Mil iutin, Minister of War under Alexander II,






Asian campaign, which bore "a certain resemblance both to
colonial wars elsewhere and to the American westward move-
-I -I Q
ment." Like Russia's expansion in the Caucasus, the
Central Asian campaign was the cause of considerable
apprehension among the British, Russia's principal rival
in South Central Asia, particularly in Iran. London
feared that Peter the Great's legendary admonishments
concerning Russian designs on India were at the heart of
St. Petersburg's foreign policy.
B. ANGLO-RUSSIAN COMPETITION IN IRAN: 1877-1921
Persia not only accepted, but in fact supported, the
Russian conquest of Central Asis as a means of eliminating
attacks by Central Asian Turkoman raiding parties, a threat
which had continually plagued Persia during the 19th century.
Nasr ed-Din, under whose reign Russo-Persian relations
119became quite amenable, provided the Russian desert force
with badly needed supplies. The Shah formally accepted
Russia's acquisition of Central Asia, including the important
Persian trade center of Merv in Turkmenistan, in the Treaty
of Akhal-Khorasan in 1881. This treaty established the
present Russo-Iranian border east of the Caspian. Nasr ed-
Din was also aware of the need to modernize Persia's
118
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inadequate military. In 1879 the Shah appointed LTC
Alexsi I. Domantovich, a Russian officer, to organize and
command a "Cossack" Brigade of Persian cavalry modeled
along Russian lines. In addition Russian naval forces were
permitted to use Persian port facilities at Enzeli (Pahlavi)
on the Caspian. Perhaps St. Petersburg's greatest coup
during this period, however, was the Railroad Agreement of
1890, by which Persia promised not to grant "a concession
for the construction of railways to a company or other
persons" of non-Russian (i.e. British) origin for a period
of ten years , a move which squelched British plans to
120build a railroad from the Persian Gulf to Tehran.
Russian ambitions in the region during the 19th century
were motivated by several factors including: (1) the
inability of Russia to expand further to the West or to gain
control over the Black Sea; (2) the vulnerability of the
politico-military "vacuum" existing between the Russian
frontier and Britain's Indian Empire; and (3) the desire
to supplant British influence in Iran, gain access to a
"warm water port," and thereby transform the Persian Gulf
121from a British into a Russian "lake." As for their
military campaigns, it seems doubtful, in retrospect, that
Russia seriously considered challenging the British position







desire to grab that which could be grabbed." Similarly,
Persia was perceived as being on the verge of total collapse,
a development which would have threatened Russian security
had the British been in a better position to pick up the
pieces. ^ St. Petersburg was interested in a buffer, not
in a colony.
By the turn of the century Russia had succeeded in
replacing the British as the pre-eminent external power in
Iran. In addition to its military campaigns and skillful
diplomacy, St. Petersburg nurtured an independent base of
support among the ulema to counter British influence with
Amin as Sultan, Nasr ed-Din Shah's Grand Vazir. Russia's
keen sense of timing was again displayed when the Czar
capitalized on British involvement in the Boer War to dis-
patch a naval flotilla, including the gunboat "Giliak," in
a good will visit to the Persian Gulf. Among the flotilla's
ports-of-call was the Persian port of Bandar Abbas. Russian
activities in the Persian capital continued even during the
Russo-Japanese War as Czarist emissaries lobbied for more
Russian advisers in the Persian army.
Following their defeat by Japan in 1905. Russia opted
for a temporary truce with the British in Iran, fearing a









Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 provided for the division
of Persia into Russian and British "spheres of influence."
According to the terms of the convention, Russia's sphere
extended north "beyond a line going from the Afghan frontier
by way of Gazik, Birjand, and Kerman ending at Bandar
12«5
Abbas." Britain's area included the southeast portion
up to a line "starting from Qasr-i-Shirin £"on the Iraqi
border 7 passing through Esfahan and Yazd ending at a point
on the Persian frontier at the intersection of the Russian
1 26
and Afghan frontiers." In the area located between the
two spheres, the convention granted both powers equal access.
Significantly, however, the important urban areas— including
Tehran, Esfahan, Tabriz, Yazd, and Mashad—all lay within the
Russian zone, while the area along the gulf coast--including
the area where oil was soon to be discovered—was either
in the neutral or British zone. Needless to say, Persia
was not a partner to the convention. Furthermore, Czarist
propaganda was able to direct most of the subsequent anti-
Convention sentiment in Iran against the British. With
access to over 2/3 of the territory of Iran, and with London
serving as the scapegoat for Persian criticism and hostility,









The revolution in Russia which resulted from the Russian
defeat in 1905 sparked a similar uprising in Persia. En-
couraged by the aspect of a small oriental nation defeating
a large and powerful Christian state, Persians demanded an
1 pQ
end to foreign influence and intrigue. Secular national-
ists were supported in their revolution by many members of
the ulema and by Russia's arch-rival, the British. Under
increasing pressure from the nationalists, Muzaffar ed-Din
Shah begrudgingly acceded to their demands for a Persian
constitution in 1906. Russia, fearing the consequences to
its interests should a viable nationalist government come
to power in Tehran, attempted to use its influence among
the northern tribes and with the Persian army to oppose the
nationalists. Meanwhile, when the ulema and other con-
servative elements failed to gain control of the Majlis
(Parliament) and rejoined the ranks of the opposition, the
Shah initiated a counter-revolution aimed at puting an end
to the constitution, parliament, and the nationalists. With
Russian encouragement, the Shah directed the Cossack Brigade
Commander, Col. Liakhoff , to have his troops storm the
parliament building and oust the nationalist deputies.
Liakhoff naturally complied, and the Cossacks devastated the
Majlis and ravaged much of the city. "While the Majlis was
being destroyed, and shortly thereafter, Russian troops in
Iran began unrestrained shootings, hangings, and torture.
1 ?fl
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Men were blown from canons, and women and children were
129butchered in the streets." ' Nationalist forces retaliated
by seizing control of the provinces of Azerbaijan and Gilan.
Royalist forces beseiged the nationalist stronghold in Tabriz
and would have starved them out had it not been for the
intervention of the Russian army. St. Petersburg ordered
a military force from the Caucasus to relieve the embattled
and starving defenders of Tabriz. Although precise Russian
motivation is still unclear, British diplomatic pressure may
have been the deciding factor.
Once the seize of Tabriz was broken by the Russian
intervention, the nationalists forces marched on Tehran and
forced the Shah to restore the constitution. Russian rein-
forcements followed the nationalists into Tehran, and on 13
July 1909 the Shah was deposed and exiled to Odessa. With
the Shah gone, it soon became evident that the Russians
harbored an ulterior motive in their switch from supporting
the monarchy to ostensibly supporting the nationalists. When
the nationalist government requested the withdrawal of all
Russian troops, St. Petersburg insisted that the presence
of their forces would continue only until order and
stability were restored. In fact, however, the Russians
had no intention of leaving, a point which became more






Russia soon tired of Iran's persistent demands that
Czarist troops evacuate Persian territory, and in July 1911
Russian complicity in a plot to restore Mohammad Ali Shah
to the Peacock Throne was uncovered as the former monarch
landed aboard a Russian steamship at Astarabad with his
brother, Sardar Arshad, and a handful of supporters. With
the backing of St. Petersburg and the support of Turkoman
tribesmen, Sardar Arshad attempted to stage a revolt in
Kurdistan. Arshad' s forces were defeated by a nationalist
army organized by an american, Morgan Shuster, who was
serving as the Treasurer General of the nationalist govern-
ment. Outraged by Shuster ' s interference in their scheme
to undo the nationalists, Russia retaliated by dispatching
12,000 troops to Iran, forcing the dismissal of Shuster and
the dissolution of the nationalist parliament. Anti-Russian
uprisings which subsequently erupted in Tabriz and Rasht
were brutally suppressed. An additional five regiments
were deployed to reinforce the Russian garrison at Tabriz,
and another force of ^,000 troops occupied Enzeli, Rasht, and
Qazvin. By January 1912 the Russian army controlled the
entire northern half of Iran. "With the dispersal of the
Majlis and Shuster' s departure, Persia virtually ceased to
130
exist as a state." J Symbolic of the savagery of the
Russian occupation was their execution of the leading Shia
mujtahid of Azerbaijan and shelling of the shrine of the
^ Kazemzadeh, p. 6^5.
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Eigth Imam in Mashad. The shrine had "been providing
sanctuary ("bast") to several hundred nationalists.
With the outbreak of World War I came another conflict
between Persian and Russian interests. Russian military
occupation of northern Iran put St. Petersburg in a
tactically advantageous position vis a vis Turkey. Iranian
attempts to remain neutral, therefore, were jeopardized by
the continued Russian occupation. St. Petersburg, however,
hoped that its military presence together with a joint
diplomatic offensive with its former rival but wartime ally,
Great Britain, would persuade Iran to join the war on the
131
side of the allies. J Iran's effort was doomed from the
outset, and on 1^ September 191*+ Turkish forces invaded Iran,
primarily in an attempt to prevent the diversion of Russian
troops from the Caucasian to the European front. Compelled
once more by concern for its interests in Persia as well
as the security of India, London dispatched Major Percy
Sykes from India to Bandar Abbas to organize and eq_uip a
tribal-based guerrilla force, the "South Persian Rifles."
Even Germany, which had developed a considerable economic
interest in Iran since the turn of the century, supported
a tribal force near Shiraz led by Wassmuss, the "German
Lawrence.
"
By the time of the Russian revolution in 1917. Iran was
in a state of almost total chaos. The war devastated the






northwestern third of the country, and. a famine ravaged the
rest. Although British pressure in part prevented the
Persian government from perfunctorily recognizing the Bolshevik
regime, Lenin and his associates undertook a number of measures
specifically designed to ingratiate the new regime in the
capital of its southern neighbors. In December the Bol-
shevik's renounced the concessions previously granted to
Russia in the Treaty of 1907. Trotsky, in a subsequent note
to the Persian government, reiterated the "nullification of
the preceding as well as the subsequent /Czaristy treaties
which, in whatever form, limit and restrict the right of the
132Persian people to a free and independent existence." -'
Foreign Commissar Chicherin provided a more detailed ex-
planation of Bolshevik intentions in a note dated 26 June
1918 in which he promised compensation for damages to Persian
property during the war, renounced any claim to "payments
of Persia, according to Tsarist obligations .. .any claim on
the revenue from customs .. .former Russian governmental and
private concessions and the Russian Bank d'Escompte of
133Persia." JJ Chicherin ' s note further acceeded to use of
the Caspian Sea for "the navigation of vessels bearing the
Persian flag" and renounced "all participation in the
organization of military units on Persian territory. " •*




In spite of the efforts of the Bolshevik regime to
normalize relations with Iran, Persian hostility toward
Russian had built up over the preceding decade to the point
where the "ugly" Russian replaced the "ugly" Briton as the
primary object of Persian disdain. The British, meanwhile,
took maximum advantage of the situation, and by 1919 Lord
Curgon's government had "tied the destiny of Iran to Great
Britain." JJ The vehicle for formalizing this bond was the
Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 which promised financial and
military assistance to Persia in return for an increased
British role in the administration of the Persian govern-
1 ?6
ment. J Opposition to the agreement in Iran was so great,
however, that it was never ratified by the Majlis. In fact,
announcement of the intended provisions of the agreement
again plunged Iran into a state of turmoil, a condition which
continued until the coup of 1921. As far as Russia was
concerned, "the British attempt to establish control over
Iran through the 1919 agreement was diametrically opposed to
both the traditional imperialist and the new revolutionary
137
aims of Russia in Iran." "
13*5
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Following the October revolution, Iran had been a
primary focus of Comintern operations in Asia. Comintern
agents, under the direction of Joseph Stalin, supported the
efforts of Persian Marxists such as Sultan Galiev and
attempted to infiltrate local nationalist movements in
Azerbaijan, led by Sheik Mohammed Khujabani, and Gilan,led
by Kuchek Khan. J The Jangali (forest) movement under
Kuchek Khan, for example, was anti-British in purpose and
Islamic nationalist in tone when it began in 1915* Initially
supported by Germany and Turkey, the Jangali 's did not turn
to the Bolsheviks for assistance until they suffered back-to-
back defeats at the hands of British forces under Dunsterville
in 1918 and of Reza Khan's Cossacks in 1919. "^ In May 1920
elements of the Red Army landed at Enzeli, ostensibly in
pursuit of White Russian forces which were using Iranian
territory as a base of operations. The Jangali' s proclaimed
the establishment of the Soviet Republic of Gilan the
following month, and by July Soviet and Jangali forces had
expanded their holding to include Mazandaran and Astarabad.
Iran protested the Bolshevik intervention at the League of
Nations and appealed to London and Washington for support.
1 "^P>
Sephr Zabih. The Communist Movement in Iran .
(Berkeley, CA: 1966)
, pp. 2-6 passim.
1 ^9Nasrollah Fatemi. Dipl
19 58 . (Seattle: 1959), p. 53-
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Tehran also selected a White Russian officer to command a
composite force tasked with restoring the central government's
authority in Gilan. The make-shift army succeeding in re-
capturing Mazandaran and Rasht in August, but stalled at
Enzeli when Bolshevik reinforcements arrived from Baku.
Meanwhile the Bolsheviks withdrew from Persian Azerbaijan
but formed another Soviet Republic in Russian Azerbaijan.
Disillusioned with the radical and anti-Islamic nature of
Bolshevik policies, however, Kuchek Khan resigned from the
Gilani government and turned control over to more radical




Ultimately, the downfall of the Gilani Republic came
about more as a result of mis-guided Bolshevik zeal than by
the force of arms of the central government. In late 1920,
a major rift occured between the Bosheviks and the Gilanis
over the position taken by the Soviets at the Comintern's
Congress of the People's of the East held in September 1920
at Baku. Chaired by Comintern President Gregory Zinoviev,
the Congress was designed to inaugurate a major socio-
political revolution in Asia. At the conference, Iran had
the second largest delegation, which was led by Hadar Khan,
1/4-0
At Brest-Litovsk, Germany included a provision
requiring Russian withdrawal from Azerbaijan as part of the







Sultan Zadeh, Ehsanullah Khan, and Ja'afar Pishavari.
Zinoviev and his fellow Bolsheviks, however, demonstrated a
crucial lack of Islamic cultural sensitivity by condeming
oriental monarchies, the "Sultan's clique, all sorts of Shahs,
Emirs, and Khans." J Statements "by other noted communists
advocating the "Bolshevization of the Muslim World" further
114,14,
alienated most delegates from Islamic countries. As
many delegates were soon to learn from firsthand experience,
the "Bolshevik menace" could pose as threatening a danger
as had colonial imperialism. Moscow later attributed its
early failures in Iran and other Islamic countries to
"tactless leftist elements" which had mistakenly criticized
14*5
the sole of Islam in eastern society. ^
On February 20, 1921 the 130-year reign of the Qajar
dynasty in Iran came to an end in a coup d'etat led by Zia
al-Din, a prominent nationalist, and Reza Khan, a colonel in
the Cossack Division. Great Britain's role in the coup has
been the subject of some speculation, in spite of London's
protest to the contrary, due in part to the presence of
British military advisers with the Cossacks at the time of
1/+2
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the coup. Six days later a Treaty of Friendship was signed
between Iran and Russia. In addition to reaffirming the
nullification of Czarist policies and concessions, the
treaty confirmed the boundaries of 1881, cancelled former
Persian debts owed to the Czarist regime, and provided for
equal access to the Caspian Sea. In return Iran promised
not to allow the use of Persian territory by "any organi-
zation or groups of persons. . .whose objective is to engage
in acts of hostility against. . .Russia, or against the allies
1^+6
of Russia. " This provision was included to prevent the
employment of Persian bases of operation by irredentist White
Russian groups. Article VI of the treaty, the subject of
considerable controversy both at the time and subsequently,
provided that "if the Persian Government should not be able
to put a stop to such menace £"i.e. use of Persian bases by
anti-Soviet forcesj after having been once called upon to do
so by Russia, Russia shall have the right to advance her
troops into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying
out the military operations necessary for its defense."
Tehran held up ratification of the treaty, however, until
all Russian troops were withdrawn, including those in Gilan.
When the Russians finally withdrew in October, Reza Khan
marched his Cossacks into Gilan, easily defeated the remnants
of the Jangali forces, and re-established the central
government's control over the province.






The Bolshevik revolution and the subsequent Treaty of
Friendship between the new regime and Iran brought to a
close one era in Iranian-Russian relations: an era which
witnessed the repeated loss of Persian territory to con-
quering Russian armies. Russian strategy during the period
was designed to fill the Central Asian "power vacuum,"
prevent any further expansion of British influence in the
region, and, if possible, gain access to a maritime outlet
148
on either the Persian Gulf or the AraDian Sea. It seems
doubtful, in retrospect, the Czarist Russia ever seriously
envisioned either the conquest of the Iranian plateau or
the Indian sub-continent as viable objectives in the Asian
strategy. What appears more likely is that Russia attempted
to employ a military threat to British control over India
and British parallel interests in Iran as a means of
pressuring London into acquiescing to Russian control over
the Turkish straits; the ultimate objective of Czarist
149policy in the Near East.
On the other hand Iranian foreign policy during this
period sought to manipulate the Anglo-Russian rivalry in
Asia to Persia's advantage and thereby maintain at least
the sovereignty of the Peacock throne, if not the territorial
integrity of the entire empire. In order to limit the
148Howard Hensel, "Soviet Policy in the Persian Gulf:
1968-1975*" unpublished doctoral dissertation, University
of Virginia, 1976, pp. 11-14.
149Firuz Kazemzadeh, "Russia and the Middle East," in
Russian Foreign Policy , ed. by Ivo J. Lederer (New Haven,
CT: 1962), p. 497; and Hensel, pp. 8-9-
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Russian advance in the Caucasus Persia could appeal to
Britain's natural concern over the corresponding threat to
its interests in the Persian Gulf. Similarly Iran could
encourage Russia's conquest of Central Asia, including the
sacrifice of territories nominally under Persian jurisdiction,
as the best method of checking British ambitions in the
region. Iran's ability to successfully employ such a
strategy was greatly inhibited, however, by the lack of a




V. IRAN AND THE SOVIET THREAT, 1921-19 59
News of the revolution in Russia was received in Iran
with mixed emotions. Nationalists such as Zia al-Din
were encouraged while others like the Anglophilic Prime
Minister Vusuq al-Dawla were less than enthusiastic. Persia
refused to recognize the Bolshevik government until all
Russian troops were withdrawn and the Anglo-Russian Con-
vention of 1907 was renounced. ^ From 1917-1920 several
successive nationalist governments attempted to normalize
relations with the Bolsheviks, but their attempts were con-
sistently thwarted by Vusuq and the British. It was Vusuq '
s
anti-Russian hostility which led to the Anglo-Persian Agreement
of 1919 > a move which cost Vusuq his job and resulted in the
landing of Bolshevik forces in Gil an. ^ The subsequent
nationalist government of Mushir al-Dawlah refused to ratify
the agreement, and, meanwhile, was instrumental in the
negotiations with the Bolsheviks which led to the treaty of
1921.
In retrospect, it is understandable why some Persians
like Vusuq were concerned about Bolshevik intentions in








interests "by "offering Iran to Britain" were unacceptable
then and mo more justifiable today. ^ Several factors,
however, did work to underscore a continued Russian threat
to Iran for which the Persian leadership had to exhibit a
degree of caution in dealing with the new regime. Although
the Bolsheviks initially envisioned the continuance of their
revolution in a European/industrial setting, after the
enunciation of Lenin's theory of imperialism in 1920, "The
Soviet leadership looked increasingly to the colonies and
semi-colonies fi.e. the Third Worldjfor the spark which
1 'S3
would produce revolution in the West." '•' As evidence of
Moscow's new policy, the Baku Conference of 1920 was convened,
as mentioned previously, and the League for the Liberation
of Islam was established. Of direct concern to Iran was
the formation that same year of the Persian Communist Party
by Haidar Khan with a membership of about 6,000. Moscow's
link with the PCP was in the person of one A. Sultazadah,
an agent of the Russian People's Commissariat of Foreign
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Mazandaran, Gilan and in Tehran, and by 1921 the PCP had
organized eleven labor unions in Tehran alone with a
membership if 8,250 workers. -^
A. SOVIET TACTICS AND RUSSIAN STRATEGY IN IRAN
Lenin's reorientation of Russian and Comintern strategy
in 1920 from a European to an Asian arena was accompanied by
an enthusiastic outpouring by communists, both in Russia and
in Asia, of support for the "political emancipation" of Asia.
While liberation of British-controlled India was touted as
the "principal objective" of this strategy, Persia was en-
visioned by some writers as "the door through which one has
to go in order to invade the citadel of the Revolution of the
Orient," adding that "the Persian uprising will be the signal
for a series of revolutions that will spread through all of
Asia and part of Africa." 3 As is readily discernable,
Lenin's "new" strategy was not new at all, but merely a
reiteration of the old Czarist strategy in this case re-
couched in Marxist-Leninist jargon to increase its palat-
ability to other communists and to Asians.
The "raison d'etre" of Lenin's Asian policy was, like
its Czarist predessor, designed to prevent a military
threat from developing along Russia's southern periphery,
whether in the form of an indigenous threat or through the
-^Ramazani
, p. 1^3 •
1 ^6
From "Vostok i Revolutsia" by K. Troyanovsky, as
quoted in Lenczowski, pp. 9-10.
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use of such territories by hostile external powers.
Another parallel between Bolshevik and Czarist strategy in
Asia was that both were a microcosm of overall Russian
policy. The Asian strategies of both regimes were designed
to apply increasing pressure on the British interests in
Iran and on Britain's colonial position in India as a
mechanism for: (1) forcing London to accept a Russian
presence in, if not complete control of, the Balkans and
the Bosphorus; (2) causing the downfall of British rule in
India and, via India, of the British colonial empire as a
whole; and, (3) eliminating Britain as a major world power,
thereby clearing the way for Russian domination of the Eastern
1 17Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean. "
Conceptually such a strategy implies that, aside from the
requirements associated with defending the state against
regional threats, Russia's southern strategy historically
has constituted only one facet of its relations with the
other great powers, particularly Great Britain. Among
western observers, this strategy is better -understood by
Soviet specialists than by their Middle Eastern counter-
parts. Works by such noted Sovietologists as Ulam, D
1 17
-"Compare the observations of Generals Skobolov and
Miliutin, advisors to Alexander II, as quoted by George
Curzon in Russia in Central Asia
, pp. 322-323, and by Firuz
Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia , pp. 39, 41-42,
50-51. and 495-496, with Lenin's philosphy as examined by
Alfred G. Meyer in Leninism , pp. 226-232.
1 to
See Adam Ulam. Expansion and Coexistence; Soviet
Foreign Policy 1917-1973 , ed. (New York: 1974).
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Aspaturian, -* and Kolkowitz consistently reflect an
appreciation for this theme in Russian foreign policy. Among
Middle East scholars, the thesis that Russian strategy in the
Middle East has been an end unto itself seems to be more
widely accepted. Fatemi , the Persian historian, notes that
Russian strategy "rested upon a profound and reasoned belief
that in Asia lay both the ends that must inspire Russian
161
policy and the means to achieve World Revolution.
"
Similarly, based on the article of Troyanovsky noted above,
Lenczowski concludes that the Czarist dream of conquering
Persia and India as proposed by Peter the Great became a
162
major objective of Soviet foreign policy.
Although the Bolshevik regimes did not digress from the
essence of the former Czarist strategy in South-Central Asia,
a uniquely Soviet adaptation of that strategy involved the
employment of a variety of political, economic, military,
and clandestine means or tactics designed to establish and
maintain a buffer or "security" zone along the southern
periphery of the Soviet Union. Initially Soviet objectives
in the region centered on the elimination of the British-
supported White Russian forces which were operating from
1 59
-''See Vernon V. Aspaturian. Process and Power in Soviet
Foreign Policy . (Boston: 1971)
.
See Roman Kolkowicz, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East,"
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Shimon Shamir (New York: 1973).
161
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162
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regional bases. Once the hostile military threat was
eliminated, Moscow hoped to increase its own influence in
the area via increased political (diplomatic) activities,
trade, and where possible, the establishment of a Soviet
military presence. The composition and size of the buffer
zone was not fixed, but rather remained flexible depending
on the geographical, political, and military factors involved
in each area, and on the international political environ-
ment at any given point in time. J Like their Czarist
predecessors, however, the Soviets continued to view its
activities in South Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the Balkans
as "complementary," to include the use of increased activity
in one area in order to effect a change in another part of
the region or as a vehicle for influencing the policies
164
of another great power. While Soviet policy continued
to emphasize the inevitability of a world revolution along
Marxist-Leninist theoretical lines as a theme of its
foreign policy, such rhetoric never became a primary
objective of Soviet strategy which was, like Czarist
strategy, based on the goal of insuring the continued
security of the state.
B. IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE NEW SOVIET REGIME,
1921-1939
Iranian foreign policy during this period reflected a









in Moscow, particularly by Iran's new Shah, Reza Khan,
who ascended the Peacock throne in 1925- Reza Sha's
concern was less with the threat posed by communism as an
ideology than with the threat from a rejeuvenated zealous
Russia which continued to rely on the same kinds of
maneuvering, intrigue, and machinations historically em-
ployed by the great powers in Iran. Articles 5 and 6
of the treaty of 1921 were evidence to which Reza Shah
could point of the desire of the Soviets to continue the
influential position in Iran acquired by their Czarist
predecessors. When Russia attempted to neutralize the
outhern threat in late 1925 by negotiating treaties of
nonaggression and neutrality first with Turkey and later
t
with Afghanistan, Reza Shah "saw his opportunity to conclude
a new agreement in which the principle of non-interference
would be concretized." Following extensive negotiations,
the resultant Treaty of Guarantee and Neutrality was signed
in 1927. The treaty included a non aggression pact, pro-
vided for mutual neutrality in case of war, and assumed
reciprical nonintervention in each country's internal
affairs. Reza Shah's government was unable, however, to
acquire a Soviet repudiation of articles 5 and 6 of the
treaty of 1921, and in fact, article k> of the new treaty










During the inter-war period, Iranian-Soviet relations
169
could be characterized as "correct but not cordial."
Iranian attitudes were clouded by their continued deep
suspicion of Soviet intentions, which were exacerbated by
Moscow's persistent refusal to drop the offensive provisions
of the treaty of 1921 in spite of the disappearance of the
military threat from Iranian territory posed by the irre-
dentist groups. Iranian leaders were also alarmed by
Moscow's continued support of subversive groups in Azerbaijan
170
and Khorasan. A factor which significantly impeded
Iran's ability to influence the Soviet Union on either of
these issues was Iran's growing dependence on Russian markets
for Iranian products. As early as 1925. ^0% of Iranian
exports went to the Soviet Union. In an effort to reduce
this economic dependencey, Reza Shah established government
trading companies for dealing with the Soviet state-run
industries and began the construction of the Trans-Iranian
Railway "to decrease and eventually eliminate the traditional
dependence of northern Iran on Russian supplies and
markets. "171
Another Iranian development during this period which had
an impact on Iranian foreign policy was the establishment by
169
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Reza Shah of Iran's first standing army. At the time Reza
Khan was appointed Minister of War in 1921, Iran's military
forces consisted of the Cossack Brigade, the gendarmarie , a
palace guard, and various tribal-based units. In their
place, Reza Khan created a unified national army. Modern
equipment was purchased from Czechoslovakia, Sweden and
Germany, aircraft from Russia and Britain, and ships from
172
Italy. Army cadets were sent to the French military
academy at St. Cyr and navy mid-shipment were trained at
the Italian Naval Academy. Swedish and White Russian
advisors and technicians assisted in the organization and
training of the new army. In 1925 compulsory military
service was instituted and in 1938 "the law was revised to
provide incentives to university and secondary school
graduates. A further re-organization occurred in 1936 which
"established new and purely Persian names for the ranks,
revised the order of battle, regulated the basis of pro-
motion, and established retirement pay, other pensions, and
173insurance for military personnel." J
A third development which significantly effected Iranian-
Soviet relations during this period was Reza Shah's attempt
to defuse the traditional Anglo -Russian rivalry in Iran by
bringing a third great power, Germany, into the picture.
172
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Such a scheme was not new in Iranian foreign policy, as
previous Persian rulers had attempted similar maneuvers, first
with France and later with the U.S. Germany, however, had
longstanding political and economic interests in Iran.
Pro -German sympathy in Iran during the war had been wide-
spread. Furthermore, Reza Shah's German connections,
which developed during the 1920 's, was opposed in the early
stages by neither the Russians nor the British. The latter
in fact encouraged the relationship as a vehicle for reducing
Russian influence. Although Reza Shah's "third-power policy
was directed principally against Russia," Moscow, like
174London, did not oppose the policy. The Soviets, who were
more concerned with domestic than external affairs at the
time, recognized that Reza Shah was providing Iran with a
degree of political and economic stability rare in Persian
history and encouraged his efforts at maintaining a neutral
17=)foreign policy. J
With Hitler's rise to power in Germany during the
mid-1930 's, Russian interest in Iranian affairs again
intensified. Moscow witnessed a rise in Nazism not only
in Europe, but increased Nazi activity in the countries
within its southern "buffer zone" as well. Such activity
17k
' Ramazani, pp. 279-281.
'-5John G. Campbell, ^The Soviet Union and the Middle
East," Russian Review, 29 (April 1970), p. 1^5.
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prompted the Kremlin .to formulate the Litinov Pro tool
in 1933 » a non-aggression pact which applied the provisions
of the Kellogg-Sriand Pact to Turkey, Iraq, and Afghan-
istan. Russian anxiety over the Nazi threat was further
aggrevated by what Moscow saw as an Anglo-Persian effort
to take advantage of Soviet concern in Europe. Reza Shah's
successful conclusion of the Saadabad Pact with Turkey,
Iraq, and Afghanistan in 1937 ultimately was perceived by
the Soviets as part of an Anglo-Persian conspiracy to
undermine Soviet influence in a contiguous but vulnerable
177
region.
C. THE IMPACT OF WORLD WAR II ON IRANIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS
Realizing the delicacy of its position vis a vis the
principle belligerents, Iran, as in WWI , attempted to remain
neutral as war brokeout in Europe in 1939* Initially
Iranian neutrality was supported by both Russia and Great
Britain. In fact Stalin, not wanting to become embroiled
in a second European war, had even gone so far as to con-
clude a non-aggression pact with Hitler in August 1939-
Therefore, when news of the subsequent negotiations in Berlin







Minister von Ribbentrop reached Tehran, apprehension among
Iranian leaders reached "near panic" proportions. Iran
was aware of Soviet concern over German intentions in the
Balkans, a region which fell within another Russian "buffer
zone." Iran's Prime Minister, Ali Mansur, attempted to
clarify a rumor that Hitler had offered Stalin a "free
hand" in Iran and the Persian Gulf in return for Soviet
179
acceptance of German hegemony in the Balkans. x What Ali
Mansur did not know, and was not able to find out, was that
when Molotov went to Berlin to emphasize Soviet interest
in the Balkans and the Dardanelles, von Ribbentrop had
presented Molotov with a draft of two secret protocols.
The first proposed that "the Soviet Union /declarej that its
territorial aspirations center south... of the Soviet Union,
181in the direction of the Indian Ocean." In the second
protocol, von Ribbentrop agreed to a revision of the
Montreux Convention of 1936 in order that "the Soviet
Union would be granted the right of unrestricted passage of
1 Op
its navy through the Straits at any time." In a reply
dated 25 November, Molotov "substantially amended" the





For text of treaty see Ralph Magnus, Documents on the
Middle East
.




German proposals, reaffirming Soviet interests in the Baltic
(i.e. Finland), the Balkans, and the Turkish straits. It
was obvious to the Russians that Berlin was attempting to
"divert" Moscow's attention away from Europe, where German
and Soviet interests might clash, to an area of limited
interest to both nations. The Kremlin, which was "not much
interested in visions of access to the Indian Ocean," did
not fall for the German ploy. ^ Instead Molotov submitted
a counter-proposal demanding "the establishment of a base
for land and naval forces of the USSR within range of the
1QI4,
Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease.
"
Molotov also "redefined" the "center of aspirations of the
Soviet Union" vis a vis its southern flank from "in the
direction of the Indian Ocean" to "the area south of Batum
and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf,"
thereby reasserting "traditional Russian interest in Iran." D
What Iran and the West did not learn until later was that
Germany, for reasons which soon became obvious, did not
accept the Russian proposal and no agreement delineating
German-Russian interests in Europe or elsewhere was reached,
thereby sealing the inevitability of war between the two








The secret protocols did not represent, as was feared by
Persia and assumed by numerous writers and observers since
then, a "blueprint of Soviet strategy in the Middle East."
Even after Hitler's army invaded Russia in June 19^+1.
Reza Shah attempted to remain neutral in the hope that if
the Soviets were forced to capitulate, the victorious
Germans might be persuaded to restore to Iran those areas
i On
in the Caucasus and Central Asia seized by Czarist Russia.
As the German amy pushed deeper into the Soviet Union,
however, Moscow became increasingly concerned with Nazi
fifth column operations in Iran and with securing a main
supply route over which equipment from the U.S. could pass
before the North Atlantic route began to ice up in the
winter. In addition, Britain was angered by the granting
of asylum by Reza Shah to the pro-German Mufti of Jerusalem
and former Iraqi Prime Minister Rashid Ali. London was
motivated also by the Allied need to insure continued access
to Persian oil, particularly should the Soviets become cut
1 ftfi
off rom their oil fields in the Caucasus. On August
25, therefore, British and Soviet troops invaded Iran employ-
ing much the same strategy as before: the Russians, invoking
Campbell, p. 151; see also A. S. Becker and A. L.
Horelick, Soviet Policy in the Middle East . (Santa Monica,
CA: 1970) , p. 1^.
l87Wilbur, p. 131.




Article 6 of the treaty of 1921, occupied the north in
a two-pronged attack through Azerbaijan and Khorasan? the
British seized control of the south, with one force pushing
east from Iraq and another force from India landing at
several points along the Gulf coast and then driving in-
land. The Iranian military was caught almost completely
by surprise, and within 48 hours the fighting was over.
Humiliated by the lack of resistance from his pampered and
highly touted army, Reza Shah abdicated, turning over the
country's administration to the Crown Prince, Mohammad Reza,
and a newly installed pro-Allied government.
In January 194-2 the Allies concluded the Tripartite
Treaty of Alliance with Iran, in which they guaranteed "the
territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence
of Iran," receiving in return the right to transport war
materials and supplies across Iran, and to utilize such
logistical and communications facilities as deemed necessary
190for the prosecution of the war. The Allies also assured
Iran that all Allied forces would be withdrawn "not later
192than six months after all hostilities. .have been suspended."
This last provision proved to be a point of considerable
189^The Soviets claimed that Iran had allowed Germany to
use Iranian territory as a base for infiltrating Nazi agents
and "terrorist groups" into the Soviet Union. For the text
of Moscow's note to Tehran dated 25 August 1941 see Leland









tension between Iran and the Soviet Union, for in the




Moscow viewed the Allied take-over of Iran as a golden
opportunity to establish their long sought after "buffer
zone" in Iran. Once the Red Army had consolidated its
hold on the northern provinces, communist agents and pro-
pagandists set about establishing regimes of "healthy forces'
at the local and provincial level. Central government
control in these provinces virtually ceased to exist. The
Soviets confiscated lands and crops, and insured that
representatives to the Majles from the northern provinces
193
were either communists or sympathizers. y ^ Marxists and
socialists infiltrated the Iranian labor movement in large
numbers, and in 19^2 the Peoples Party, later to become the
Tudeh (Masses) Party, was organized with Soviet support.
Communist provacateurs were active not only among Turkish,
Armenian, and Kurdish minorities in the north, but among
minority groups in the British sector as well. An Irano-
Soviet Society for Cultural Relations was founded in 19^3
>
and immediately became the principle organ for the dissem-
ination of Soviet propaganda in Iran. Moscow also published
several Persian language newspaper and journals, while Tass
,
the Soviet News Agency, pressured Persian independent and
192Spector, p. 197-
193^See Lenczowski, Russia and the West. .
.




government-run news media, such as the Journal de Tehran and
Radio Tehran , into disseminating pro-Soviet articles and
19^broadcasts.
Following the Red Army's heroic stand at Stalingrad in
the winter of 19^-2 and their defeat of the German army at
Kursk the following summer, Moscow was able to devote even
more attention to its activities in Iran. In the fall of
19^3 and in the spring of 19^ > the Soviets became concerned
over British concessionairy rights in Iran, in this instance
involving moves by Royal Dutch Shell to acquire such rights
in Baluchistan. On this issue Soviet and Persian interests
in fact coincided, since like Moscow, Tehran was opposed to
"having the entire southern coast of Iran tied up under
19*5
British concessions." ^ Where the Soviet and Iranian inter-
ests collided, however, was over the reception by Iran of
offers by Standard Oil and Sinclair, two American companies,
for similar concessions. When Tehran appeared on the verge
of accepting the American bids, Moscow demanded exclusive
rights to oil exploration in the northern provinces. The
Russian demand was promptly rebuffed by the Persian govern-
ment, explaining that it had decided to postpone the issue
196
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Kremlin launched a fierce propaganda campaign against the
Iranian government, particularly Prime Minister Sa'id, it
is doubtful that the Russians were as concerned about getting
their own concessions as they were about preventing any
expansion of British concessions and any granting of an
American concession. The Soviets were hostile especially
to any action which might lead to Western penetration of
northern Iran. In a cable to the State Department, George
F. Kennan, then the charge of the American Embassy in Moscow,
noted that "the oil of Northern Iran is important not as
something Russia needs, but as something it might be dangerous
197
to permit anyone else to exploit."
D. THE COLD WAR YEARS
Following the surrender of the Japanese in September 19^5
»
Soviet involvement in Iran took on still another dimension.
That same month a group of Kurdish nationalists under Qazi
Muhammad, a religious leader from Mahabad, formed the
democratic Party of Kurdistan. The objectives of Qazi
Muhammad's KDP included the establishment of an autonomous
Kurdish state within Iran and the use of Kurdish as the
official language within that state. Earlier a similar
organization with similar objectives had been formed among
the Azeri community in Azerbaijan under the leadership of





during WWI. The real "mastermind" behind these movements,
198
however, was the Soviet consul general in Tabriz".
Although the ranks of the two movements were swelled by
"volunteers "from Azeri and Kurdish communities in the Soviet
Union and Iraq, the aims of both groups were essentially
nationalistic as compared with the more doctrinaire communist
199ideology espoused by the Tudeh Party. 77 The popular
militias established by the ADP and the KDP would have been
no match for the forces of the central government in Tehran,
however, had the Red Army not intervened. This action by
the Soviet forces enabled the two movements to announce the
formation of the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and the
Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in December 19^5 • That same
month Moscow informed the U.S. that since the Soviet Union
had committed its forces to Iran under the provisions of
the treaty of 1921, a decision to evacuate Soviet forces
would be made based on the security interests of the Soviet
Union and not solely on the provisions of the Tripartitie
Agreement.
Under the circumstances, Iran had little choice but to
seek outside help. In January Tehran appealed to the U.S.
and Great Britain for assistance, and presented its case








Moscow retaliated by increasing the size of the Red Army
201force in Iran. While Iran continued to press for a
Soviet withdrawal at the UN, Prime Minister Qavam went to
Moscow to negotiate directly with the Kremlin leadership.
Little progress was made during these negotiations until
March, at which time, according to Adam Ulam, a speech
delivered by Winston Churchill at Fulton Missouri in which
he encouraged the U.S. to employ force if necessary to
prevent further Russian encroachments, caused the Soviets
20 2
to have second thoughts about their involvement in Iran.
Although the exact nature of the U.S. response remains
unclear, Moscow was undoubtedly not anxious for a showdown
20 3
with the U.S. over Iran. J Later that month the Soviets
agreed to withdraw from Iran; in return Tehran agreed to:
(1) negotiate in good faith with the Azeri and Kurdish
Republics the exact nature of the relationship with the
central government; (2) appoint Tudeh Party members to the
Cabinet; and (3) form with the Soviet Union a Joint-Stock
company for developing petrolem resources in northern
20^4-
Iran. Tehran accepted the Russian proposal, and the




202Adam Ulam. Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign
Policy 1917-1973 , 2nd ed. (New York: 197*0, pp. ^23-^25.
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Once the Russian military forces were gone, however,
Iran demonstrated that it felt no obligation to fulfill
terms of an agreement made "under duress." Ostensibly under
the guise of supervising parliamentary elections, Iranian
troops re-occupied Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in December.
Lacking the protection of the Red Army the two republics
quickly collapsed. Prime Minister Qavam also formed a
new cabinet "sans" the Tudeh representatives and ordered
the arrests of several party members. The following year
when the Soviet oil concession was presented to the over-
whelmingly pro -government Majlis, it was not ratified.
Moscow lodged a formal protest, increased ant i-government
propaganda, and imposed a boycott on Iranian goods. Iran's
new Prime Minister, Ibrahim Hakiini » retaliated by arresting
20 "5
300 Tudeh members. J The escalating tension between Tehran
and Moscow came to a head in 19^9 when, in the wake of an
attempt on the Shah's life by a member of the Tudeh party,
Iran declared martial law, outlawed the Tudeh party, and
jailed most known communists and their sympathizers. As a
result, Moscow recalled its ambassador and closed its con-
sulates in four Iranian cities. In March Tehran accused the
Soviets of violating Iran's border by dispatching Russian
troops into Azerbaijan and subsequently capturing several
Iranian soldiers. Iran countered by threating to abrogate
the treaty of 1921, a threat which was prudently dropped. 20
2° 5Ibid.
, pp. 312-313.
¥. B. Ballis, "Soviet-Iranian Relations during the
Decade 1953-1964," Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of
the USSR
. 12 (November 1965) , p. 9-
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Iranian-Soviet tension continued until 1950 when the Iranian
government, under Prime Minister Ali Razmara, agreed to
establish a joint commission with the Soviet Union for
settling several territorial disputes in the northern
provinces.
This crisis in Iranian-Soviet relations was soon
overshadowed by other events: the Kremlin's attention
focused on the conflict in Korea while Iran became embroiled
in the oil nationalization issue. Moscow was interested in
the nationalization issue, however, because it recognized
in it an opportunity to strike a blow against British in-
fluence in Iran. For this reason, the Soviets supported
Dr. Mossadiq and his drive to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company. Initially Mossadiq was supported also by the
Tudeh Party, which resurfaced during the crisis. The Tudeh
eventually had a falling-out with Mossadiq, however, over
the latter' s insistence on the need for negotiating a
207
settlement and on his reliance on the U.S. as a mediator.
Similarly, Moscow was critical of what it perceived as
Washington's attempt to ensure that control over Iranian
oil simply passed from British into American hands."
Soviet convictions in this regard hardened as the crisis
deepened in 1952/53- In April 1952 Mossadiq accepted the








year the flamboyant prime minister refused to renew a
fisheries agreement with the Soviet Union. If the Kremlin
needed any further evidence of U.S. intent, it was provided
by U.S. complicity in the counter-coup in August 1953 which
overthrew the Mossadiq regime. Moscow's inability to
influence this course of events in its favor was due to
two factors. In the first place, Stalin's death in March
1953 created a leadership crisis in the Kremlin and had a
numbing effect on Soviet foreign policy for several years
thereafter. Secondly, Moscow's domestic ally in Iran, the
Tudeh Party, proved to be ineffective as a revolutionary
209
vanguard since it was itself highly factional ized.
In the aftermath of the oil national ization/Mossadiq
crisis, Iranian-Soviet relations continued to be based on
mutual suspicion and enmity in spite of the change of
regimes in the Kremlin. As the post-Mossadiq regimes in
Tehran leaned even more heavily on the West for security
against Soviet machinations, Moscow became more bellicose,
a response which only served to heighten Persian trepidation
about Soviet intentions. Under the circumstances, the Western
call for a regional security pact fell on receptive ears in
Tehran. The only positive note in Iran's relations with the
Soviets came in 195^- when the two countries concluded a
trade agreement which included a provision for the return by
Moscow of 11 tons of gold and eight million dollars in goods




respite was soon annulled by Tehran's discovery the following
year of a Soviet spy ring involving 600 Iranian officers
operating within the Iranian army.
In addition to its apprehension over Kremlin attempts
to subvert Iran, Tehran was concerned with the activist
foreign policy emanating from Cairo in the wake of the coup
of 1952. Iran's desire to maintain regional stability con-
flicted with Nasser's drive against Zionism, imperialism,
and Western security alliances. As the charismatic "spokes-
man for Arab nationalism," Nasser sought to foster Egypt's
leadership position within the Arab World by championing
the attack against the "reactionary" monarchies of the
Persian Gulf.
By the mid- 50s, as Khruschev began to emerge as the
central figure in the post-Stalin regime, Kremlin policy in
the region began to display subtle changes in its traditional
strategy of confrontation and revolution. Regional states
adjacent to the Soviet Union like Turkey and Iran became
aware of the Kremlin's effort to undermine Western influence
in the area by developing linkages with progressive regimes
in the area which could serve as a counter-balance to the
pro-Western regimes in Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. The
first evidence of Moscow's new approach in the region came
in late 1953 when the new Kremlin leadership signed a trade
agreement with the Nehru government in India. So successful
was the agreement in improving Soviet-Indian relations that
112

Moscow's support for the hard-line Indian Communist Party,
to which Soviet foreign policy under Stalin had been totally
committed, began to wane as the post-Stalin leadership de-
veloped a greater appreciation for the political benefits
accured from cooperating with ruling non-communist regimes,
a doctrine which eventually became the mainstay of
210
Khruschev's policy toward the Third World. By 1955 the
ramifications of Khruschev's policy became clearer still as
the Soviets concluded arms sales agreements with the "pro-
gressive" regimes of Prime Minister Daoud in Afghanistan
and Nasser in Egypt.
This turn in Soviet foreign policy led to a significant
change in Iranian foreign policy. As Muhammad Reza Shah
began to play a more direct role in the formulation of Iran's
foreign policy in the aftermath of the Mossadiq crisis,
Iranian policy became less concerned with external influence
in Iranian affairs than it did with the need for strengthening
Iran's security posture, both as the best method for preventing
such intervention as well as for solving many of Iran's
211domestic problems. As a result, the Shah abandoned the
"third-power policy"
—
previously adhered to by both his
210See Oles M. Smolansky, The Soviet Union and the Arab
East under Khrushchev (Cranbury, N.J. : 197*0 » p. 291; see also
Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Policy Toward India (Cambridge,
MA: 197*0, PP. 112, 112-132.
211See Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Mission for my Country
(New York: ), pp. 290-296.
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father and himself--in favor of security ties with the West,
212
or as the Shah put, it, "positive nationalism." Toward
this end, the Shah re-established diplomatic relations with
London in December 1953—broken off by Mossadiq in October
1952—and concluded an agreement with a Western oil consortium
in August 195^. The cornerstone of Iran's new strategy was
the Baghdad Pact (later called CENTO) , which Iran joined in
1955' Iran's vision of the Pact as the best mechanism for
improving its overall security was soon shattered by Washing-
ton's decision not to join the organization as a full partner.
Although Iran recognized the inherent limitations of a
security alliance which lacked a complete American commit-
ment, the Soviet Union viewed the Pact as a direct threat
to Russian national security.
When Moscow's intense campaign to forestall Iranian
involvement in the Baghdah Pact failed, the Kremlin's initial
response reflected Soviet anxiety over the organizations
anti-Russian basis. Anti-western propaganda increased,
and Moscow threatened to invoke Article 6 of the treaty of
1921 if Iran allowed foreign bases within its territory.
Once the Kremlin realized that such a response was counter-
productive, it changed its tactics in the hope of minimizing
Iranian participation in the organization. Iran was offered
a non-aggression pact and economic aid in return for assur-




Chapter 6; and Ramazani, 19^-1-1973 , pp. 258-260
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U.S. missile bases on Iranian soil nor actively participate
in the military aspects of the pact. At one point, Moscow
even offered to re-negotiate the treaty of 1921 as a quid
pro quo for Iranian withdrawal from the pact, a condition
213
unacceptable to Iran. -*
A similar scenario to that which led to Iranian participation
in the Bahgdad Pact unfolded in the late 50' s. In 1958 the
Iraqi "branch of the Hashemite monarchy was overthrown in a
bloody coup which resulted in the brutal murder of the entire
royal family. Although not implicated initially, Iraqi
communists played a major part in the country-wide bloodbath
which followed the coup. Iran was able to use the Iraqi
coup, together with the Eisenhower Doctrine and the impli-
cations of its ongoing negotiations with the Soviets for a
non-aggression pact, to extract a bi-lateral security agree-
ment with the U.S. Following the announced signing of the
agreement in March 1959 » Moscow broke diplomatic relations
with Tehran. Such a drastic move by Moscow was probably not
limited solely to the U.S. -Iranian agreement, but was due,
at least in part, to the Shah's unilateral declaration
three days before the bi-lateral pact was signed that Iran
no longer considered as valid Articles 5 and 6 of the treaty






VI. THE ASCENDANCE OF IRAN AND ITS IMPACT ON IRANIAN-SOVIET
RELATIONS
The severance of diplomatic relations with Tehran by
Moscow as a result of the former's conclusion of a bi-
lateral accord with the U.S. marked the nadir of Iran's
post-war relationship with the Soviet Union. Both parties
realized, however, the dangers inherent in the prolongation
of such a state of affairs , and that a relationship which
continually manifested such enmity was in the best interest
of neither country. Abreak in the crisis came in August i960
with the fall of the virulently anti-Soviet government of
Prime Minister Iqbal , which was occasioned by the return
of Moscow's ambassador to Tehran. Sqbal ' s interim successor,
Sharif -Imami, immediately entered into discussions with the
21^
Soviets in an effort to improve their relations.
Although Iranian-Soviet relations during this period were
at an all-time low, Iran also was developing a deeper appre-
ciation for the limits of the Western commitment to Iranian
security. As early as 1956 1 "the West had failed to support
the Hungarian uprising, and the U.S. turned against its for-
most European allies, France and Great Britain, in their
attempt to ensure continued Western control over the Suez
Canal. During the Iraqi coup of 1958, Iran found its
Western allies unwilling to intervene to save the Hashemite
21U
Ramazani. Iran's Foreign Policy, 19^1-1971 , p. 30 2.
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throne, this in spite of the successful operation to preserve
the Pahlavi throne in Iran five years earlier. Iran was
disturbed further "by the U.S. refusal to include provisions
for American assistance to Iran to combat either internal
subversion or non-communist external threats within the
parameters of the bilateral pact. In addition, the open
criticism by the newly innauguerated Kennedy administration
of Iran's guns-for-butter defense expenditures did little to
enhance Iranian confidence in the consistency of the American
21
5
commitment. J Doubts in Tehran about the new administration's
resolve to combat communism presumably were exacerbated even
further by Washington's handling of the Bay of Pigs fiasco.
This uncertainty about Western, and particularly American,
resolve to defend Iranian interests, together with the de-
pressed state of Iranian -Soviet relations, led to another
change in Iranian foreign policy. Termed by the Shah an
"independent national policy," it was designed primarily to
"normalize" relations with the Soviet Union while simultaneously
on
f.decreasing Iranian dependence on American support. Accord-
ing to the Shah, Iran's new foreign policy would be:
215




Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. Mission for my country .
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based on the principles of the pursuit of peace; on
peaceful coexistence with all nations and societies
irrespective of different ideologies and systems of
government; on support of every effort to establish
and assure social justice on national or inter-
national scales and of every attempt to bridge the gap
between the rich and the poor; and, on international
cooperation in the struggle against illiteracy,
starvation, disease, and other contemporary social
ills. 217
Although, in retrospect, Iran's independent national policy
did little to alter Tehran's posture vis a vis the U.S., it
had a significant impact on Iranian-Soviet relations.
A. IRANIAN -SOVIET RAPPROCHEMENT
As was stated earlier, both Iran and the Soviet Union
were, in the aftermath of the crisis surrounding the signing
of the U.S. -Iranian bi-lateral agreement, exploring ways for
normalizing their relationship. Toward this goal, a compromise
was eventually reached in 1962 whereby Iran agreed to withdraw
its demand for a nullification of the objectionable articles
in the treaties of 1921 and 1927 in return for a similar
concession by the Soviets to shelve their demand for Iranian
withdrawal from CENTO. This compromise set the stage for
the subsequent formal accord which marked a turning point
in post-war Iranian-Soviet relations. Through a series of
notes between Tehran and Moscow exchanged in September i960,
Moscow agreed to: (1) curtail its anti-Iranian propaganda
activities, (2) construct a steel mill in Iran, and (3)
217Iran, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Iran's Foreign Policy:
A compendium of the Writings and Statements of His Imperial
Majesty Shahansha Aryamehr (Tehran; ND)
,
p. 13, as quoted by
Ramazani
, p. 314.
2l8The Shah had been trying for some time and without success
to finance the construction of such a plant through European
and American financial institutions.
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assist in the development of Iran's oil and gas resources.
As a quid pro quo, Tehran pledged not to allow the deploy=
ment of foreign missiles on Iranian territory. This pledge
by Iran reflected the shift in Kremlin strategy under
Khruschev to defense against nuclear rather than conventional
219
threats. For Moscow, therefore, the agreement provided
the necessary reassurance of the limited nature of Iran's
security link with the West. It demonstrated that membership
in a Western alliance per se need not preclude a country
from engaging in normal diplomatic and economic relations
with socialist states. In this respect, the Iranian-Soviet
accord probably encouraged those in the Kremlin who advocated
such an approach for encouraging a de facto nonaligned or
neutral position by states along the southern periphery of the
Soviet Union. From an Iranian perspective, the accord was
evidence of a realization that membership in a Western
security alliance was not a panacea for a broad range of
security problems, but was both limited in scope and
dependent for its viability on the resolve of its great power
220
sponsor.
The fruits of the Tehran 'Moscow rapprochement were not
long in coming. In 1963 a transit agreement was concluded
which provided for reduced rates for Iranian goods shipped
to Europe via the Soviet Union and for Soviet goods shipped
21%ee Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy 19^1-1973 , pp. 317'
318.
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Chub in and Zabih, p. 7.
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from Iranian ports on the Persian Gulf. A joint shipping
company was later established to handle the shipment of goods
through both countries. Moscow also agreed in 19&3 ^° con-
struct a hydro-electric facility on the Aras River, which
forms part of Iran's northwestern boundary with the Soviet
Union, and to share equally the power output of the install-
ation with Iran. A three-year trade agreement was signed in
196^+ and extended by a five-year agreement in 1967. These
agreements provided for a 3*5 fold increase in Iranian exports
to the Soviet Union. According to a 1970 supplementary agree-
ment, the Soviets promised to purchase nearly 3/^ billion
dollars in Iranian goods from 1970-1975* making Russia
"the largest single market for Iranian manufactured
221products.
"
Iran's most significant agreements with the Soviets both
from an economic and a politico-military standpoint, came in
1966. The first agreement provided for Soviet technical
assistance and financial support for the construction of a
steel mill, a gas pipeline, and a machine tool plant in
Iran. The costs of these projects was covered by an initial
Russian loan of $300 million repayable at a very low rate of
interest. That same year Iran became the first member of a
western alliance to purchase Soviet arms when Tehran purchased
$110 million in weaponry and other military hardware from
Moscow. Iran arranged to pay for the arms and repay the
?2~\




loan with shipments of natural gas via the pipeline which
Russia would help construct connecting the Iranian gas
fields at Ahvaz with Soviet Azerbaijan. The pipeline was
completed and gas transfers begun in 1970. Manifestations
of Iranian-Soviet cooperation were not limited to the early
1960s. Prior to the completion of the steel mill in Esfahan,
Iran arranged for an additionaly $300 million Soviet loan in
order to double the output of the mill. Construction was
finally completed in 1973* In 1972 Iran signed a 15-year
Treaty of Economic and Technical Cooperation with the Soviet
Union which provided for the further expansion of trade and
cooperation between the two nations, and for the promotion of
222
regional cooperation and trade as well. Since the opening
of the gas pipeline in 1970, Iran has agreed to increase
its gas shipments to Russia in order to enable Moscow to
increase its own gas sales to Western Europe. In addition,
the Soviets have been purchasing, since 1973 t about 2 MMT
of Iranian oil per year. ^ Moscow also granted Iran $325
million in economic credits in 1977 through 1980, by which
time the value of the two countries trade is expected to





-^Robert W. Campbell, "Some Issues in Soviet Energy
Policy for the Seventies," Middle East Information Series
,
26-27 (Spring/Summer 197^), p. 99.
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its military expenditures, Tehran has continued to purchase
some military equipment from the Russians, estimated by one
source to be valued at over $500 million since 1973
•
As this discussion shows, the Iranian-Soviet rapprochement
has been limited primarily to cooperation in economic rather
than political affairs. The Pahlavi regime's close ties
with the West, particularly its military ties with the U.S.,
posed a difficult obstacle for any significant progress in
Iranian-Soviet political relations. The lack of progress in
the political realm, however, is mitigated somewhat by the
scope of developments in the two countries economic relations.
As one source noted, "one of the most dramatic developments
in Moscow- Tehran relations in the post-revolutionary Tpost-
1917J period has been the depth and range of economic ties
225
established during the last decade*" J Improved economic
relations may yet serve as a vehicle for similar developments
in the political area, particularly given the apparent demise
of the monarchy and the as yet uncertain nature of future
Iranian foreign policy.
So far this chapter has described those external factors
behind Iran's so-called independent national policy of the
224Interview with Date Tahtinen, American Enterprise
Institute, Washington, D.C., 20 April 1978.
22S
-^Bettie M. and Oles M. Smolansky, "Soviet and Chinese
Influence in the Persian Gulf," in Soviet and Chinese Influence




early 60's, to include Mohammad Reza Shah's motivation and
rationale for replacing Iran's former third-power policy.
Before continuing with an assessment of more recent develop-
ments in Iranian foreign policy and Iranian-Soviet relations,
it is necessary to pause and reflect briefly on developments
in the international arena which eventually led to changes
in Soviet foreign policy. Challenges to Moscow's position
in the international system during the '60s effected its
policy toward the Middle East, including its relationship
with Iran. Both the Berlin and Cuban missile crises un-
equivocally demonstrated to the entire world weaknesses and
shortcomings in the Soviet system. Khruschev's foreign
policy, which emphasized a forward posture for the Kremlin
in the Third World, stalled during the early '60s as "pro-
gressive" regimes in Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Algeria, and
Indonesia collapsed in rapid succession. Although the Soviet
toehold in the Western hemisphere proved more resilient,
efforts to use Cuba as a spring-board to the rest of Latin
America persistently failed, as in the Dominican Republic in
1965. in Bolivia in 1967 > and more recently in Chile in 1973-
As if these difficulties were not sufficiently vexing, Peking
emerged in the late '50s as a malignant threat to Moscow's
leadership of the communist bloc. Peking's border war with




In the Middle East, the Soviet position also began to
develop signs of stress. Moscow's decision in 19&3 to "under-
write" Nasser's campaign in Yemen proved to be a disaster as
the conflict dragged on for five years at considerable
expense to, and with little or no benefit for either the
Russians or the Egyptians. For Iran, however, Nasser's Yemen
adventure served as conclusive evidence of a long range
Egyptian strategy, supported by the Kremlin, to acquire a
share of the peninsula's vast petroleum resources. The
following year the pro-Soviet Qasim regime in Iraq was over-
thrown by the highly nationalistic Ba'th. Israel's blitzkrieg
against the Arabs in 19^7 further undermined Soviet policy in
the region. Moscow's humiliation over the totality of the
Arab defeat was so great that by 1970 the Kremlin had taken
the unprecedented step of committing Soviet troops to the
defense of Egypt during the "War of Attrition. " This crisis
clearly demonstrated the limited nature of the Soviet commit-
ment to the Arab cause given the Kremlin's dogged refusal to
risk further direct involvement in any future Arab offensive.
These setbacks, both in the Middle East and elsewhere,
led Moscow to adopt a less flamboyant and more pragmatic
approach toward the Persian Gulf region during the '60s. At
the 22nd Party Congress the importance of improving Soviet-
Iranian relations was stressed. Soviet leaders gradually
developed an appreciation for the limited nature of the threat
See Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Moscow and Cairo: Currents of
Influence," Problems of Communism , 23 (July 197^), p. 20.
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posed by Iranian membership in CENTO and by Iran r s bi-lateral
accord with the U.S. Khruschev in particular realized that
the shift in Iranian foreign policy toward a more balanced
position could have positive impact on Soviet-Iranian
relations. The Kremlin attempted to respond to this fav-
orable shift in the Iranian position "by altering their
strategy from one of confrontation and maintenance of a
227high level of tension to one of cooperation and amelioration'.'
Tehran's rapprochement with Moscow continued to prevail
relatively intact for several years. By the late '60s,
however, issues arose and events occured necessatating policy
modifications, and resulting in increased tension and sus-
pension between the two states. Iran tended to relate these
tensions to a more assertive Soviet posture in the region as
an outgrowth of leadership change in the Kremlin. While the
impact of Soviet leadership and policy changes on Soviet-
Iranian relations was significant, it was certainly not the
only factor involved. Of equal importance in this equation
were environmental and domestic changes which effected Iran
in the late 60s. Like the developments which resulted in a
revised Soviet foreign policy, these stimuli led to a de
facto change in Iranian policy. The Iranian policy which
emerged in the late 60s was at best in competition with, and





A discussion of those factors which led to successive
changes in Iranian foreign policy and, concomitantly, to
heightened tensions in Iranian-Soviet relations will be the
subject of the remainder of this chapter.
B. THE IMPACT OF DETENTE ON IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY
Initially, Iran was encouraged by the prospect of detente
between its principal antagonist, the Soviet Union, and its
primary ally, the U.S. Iran was a beneficiary of the detente
process as early as 1962 when the Iranian-Soviet missile base
agreement inauguerated Tehran's rapprochement with Moscow.
This agreement in fact preceded the first superpower accord,
the test ban treaty, which was not signed until 1963* For
the most part, much of the impetus for the improved atmosphere
in which Iranian-Soviet relations were conducted throughout
most of the 60s can be attributed to the East-West dialogue.
By the late '60s, however, Iran became increasingly concerned
that detente was in fact enhancing the Soviet politico-military
posture at the expense of the U.S., and was promoting increased
/ 229Soviet activity in the Middle East/Persian Gulf region.
Viewing events in a basically zero-sum framework, Iran
perceived detente as having allowed the Soviet Union to
achieve nuclear parity with the U.S. at the expense of
22o-r\Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy, 19^1-1973 , p. 317-
^Shahram Chubin, "Iran's Foreign Policy 1960-1976: An
Overview," in Twentieth-Century Iran , ed. by Hossein Amirsadeghi
(New York: 1977) , p. 201.
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230American strategic superiority. J More importantly,
however, was Iran's concern with the expansion, under the
Brezhnev/Kosygin regime, of Soviet conventional forces.
Elements of the Soviet navy began to deploy in strength into
the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean area about this same time.
Iran can point to several examples of Soviet involvement
in the region during the early to mid-60s which demonstrate
the duality which was emerging in Soviet foreign policy, i.e.
a continuous dialogue with the West to reduce East-West
tensions while simultaneously maintaining a forward posture
in the Third World. As was mentioned earlier, the Kremlin's
support for Nasser's adventuresome policy created suspicions
in Tehran about Soviet attempts to employ their Egyptian
surrogates to eventually gain a foothold on the Arabian
peninsula. Even closer to home, Moscow's close relations
with the Qasim regime in Iraq were viewed as a contributing
factor in that government's attempt in 1961 to forcibly annex
Kuwait. Quick action by the British stimied Qasim' s plan.
Although Iraq's pro-Soviet strongman was overthrown by the
Ba'th, as was pointed out earlier, the new government lasted
only a few months and was itself ousted by the Arif regime,
which promptly re-established ties with Moscow.
Another example of the inability of detente to temper
Soviet activities in the region was Kremlin support for an
230J Chubin and Zabih, p. 11.
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irredentist group in southern Arabia known as the Dhofar
231
Liberation Front. •* Moscow's initial involvement was
limited, possibly as a result of the earlier failure of its
effort in North Yemen to establish a presence on the
peninsula. When the British-sponsored Federation of South
Arabia collapsed in 19&7 > however, an Egyptian-backed pro-
Soviet group emerged from the subsequent power struggle. As
a result, more Soviet aid was funneled to the Dhofaris through
Moscow's new allies in Aden. Reverberations from the result-
ant escalation in the Dhofar conflict were felt as far away
as London and Washington. Oman, whose control over Dhofar
was threatened by the conflict, was able to drum up sufficient
support— initially from Britain, but later from Iran, Jordan,
and the U.S. --to mount a counter-insurgency operation. For
Iran, these experiences represented conclusive evidence that
Soviet involvement both in the Gulf region and in the Third
World as a whole would be deterred only by a strong regional
and Western response and not by any reliance on the rhetoric
232
of detente. ^
231J Later called the Popular- Front for the Liberation of
the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG) , and subsequently the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO).
232J Interview with Dr. Assad Humayun, Political Officer,
Embassy of Iran, Washington, D.C., 18 April 1978.
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In addition to the inability of detente to forestall
Soviet adventurism in the Middle East, Iran was concerned with
another shortcoming of detente: the inapplicability of
detente as a framework for reducing tension and conflict
in the region. As one of the principle architects of
Iranian foreign policy, the late Amir Abbas Hoveyda noted,
"detente is a commodity. . .much in demand in... Asia and the
Middle East, for we believe that peace can only prove durable
233
when it's indivisab 1 e ." JJ Detente had not, according to
Iran, contributed to the solution of the area's most in-
tractable dispute: the Arab-Israeli conflict. Iran, there-
fore, was critical of the policies of both superpowers
because: (a) their arms transfers to the belligerents had
exacerbated rather than reduced the scope of the conflict,
and (b) both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were (prior to
the October War) inexorably committed to states on opposing
sides, thereby preventing either superpowers from. playing a
constructive mediating role. Iran felt that its own policy
toward the conflict—which combined de facto recognition of
Israel with political support for Palestnian rights and
(after the Six-day War) the return of occupied territory
—
served as a better example of constructive external involvement.
Perhaps even more disconcerting to Iran than the
inherently limited scope of detente was the effect detente
233^
-^Premier Abbas Hoveyda to a CENTO conference of ministers,
excerpts of which appeared in Kehan and Ettela' at on 16 and
20 June, 1973 > respectively; quoted by Ramazani , Iran '
s
Foreign Policy, 19^-1-1973 , p. 3^2.
129

was having on the foreign policy of its major ally, the U.S.
Iran was concerned that while Moscow viewed its Middle Eastern
adventures as extraneous to detente, Washington, on the other
hand, pursued the opposite interpretation, i.e. that all
facets of superpower relations were included within the
framework of detente. Based on this perception, American
foreign policy, epitomized in the Nixon Doctrine, was viewed
by Tehran as a retrenchement by the U.S. from areas of non-
vital American interest, such as the Persian Gulf and Indian
Ocean. For Iran, Washington's failure to assist Pakistan in
its wars with India in 1965 and 1971 vividly demonstrated
the U.S. unwillingness to intervene directly in Third World-
23^
conflicts. J In the case of Pakistan, the U.S. had proved
that it was willing to sacrifice its commitment to a Third
World ally in order to preserve its image of detente.
Following the '71 war, an article appearing in the semi-
official newspaper Kayhan noted that "Pakistan, an ally of
the United States through two multilateral ^CENTO and SEAToJ
and one bilateral treaty, has been attacked and dismembered
without as much as a ripple of serious protest. There is
no reason why Pakistan's plight should be treated as an
isolated case that could not be repeated else where in the
23^
region." JJ
J Interview with Dr. Humayun.




C. IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE' WAKE OF' THE BRITISH
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PERSIAN GULF
Although British involvement in Iran and the Gulf has
been criticized extensively by Iranians and other littoral
residents, Iran was deeply concerned by the Labor government's
announcement in 1968 that all British military forces "East
of Suez" would be withdrawn by 1971- Britain's willingness
to come to the aid of Gulf states endangered by externally
supported radical elements--as when British forces prevented
the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq in 1961 and when British
officers were seconded into the service of the Sultan of
Oman in 1968—was a factor which Iran recognized had con-
tributed significantly to the maintenance of security and
stability in the Gulf. Tehran was prepared for an eventual
British withdrawal from the region, but had not anticipated
that it would happen at that early date. At this point,
however, Iran was neither politically nor militarily pre-
pared for a British withdrawal. As a result, it was some
time before a coherent Gulf policy emerged in Tehran.
Iran's initial and largely "negative" reactions reflected
surprise and a rising fear that the British move would create
a "power vacuum" in the area, a vacuum which would invite
Soviet intervention. Iran opposed the British effort to form
a confederation among the Arab sheikdoms of the Gulf, voiced
a historical claim to the island sheikdom of Bahrain (which
Britain proposed to include in the confederation) , and
2




insisted that security of the Gulf was solely the respon-
sibility of the littoral states. This attitude on the part
of Iran adversely effected Iranian relations with the Arab
states of the gulf and with other Middle Eastern states.
The renewal of Iran's claim to Bahrain aroused considerable
anxiety among several other gulf sheikdoms whose territories
included lands formerly a part of the Persian Empire. In
addition, the Iranian position on Bahrain was the object
237
of anti-Iranian propaganda from Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. -"
The Bahraini issue continued to hinder the development of a
cohesive and pragmatic gulf policy in Tehran until it was
settled in May 1970, at which time Iran agreed to recognize
Bahrain's independence.
It was not only surprise over Great Britain's withdrawal
announcement and its own bellicose handling of the Bahrain
issue which complicated Iranian foreign policy from 1968-
1971. Soviet foreign policy emerged in 1968 with sereiral
significant modifications to Khruschev's strategy in the
region. By 1968 , the new Kremlin leadership had been
massaging a revised foreign policy for four years, and with
the Czech invasion, the Brezhnev-Kosygin team consolidated
its leadership position, and Soviet foreign policy reflected
an additional degree of self-confidence and assertiveness . ^
2^7 Ibid.
, p. 220.
^ See Vernon V . Aspaturian, "Moscow's Options in a
Changing World," Problems of Communism , Vol. 1, No. ^ (July/
August 1972), pp. 2-3.
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Moscow's Third World policy under Brezhnev and Kosygin had
two basic objectives: (a) establish and maintain friendly
relations with the states along its southern periphery, and
in so doing ;: contain" and "encircle'' the PRC , and (b) nor-
malize relations with all Third World nations, whether "
progressive" or not, thereby "broadening" Moscow's base of
international support and avoiding involvement in regional
conflicts. The Soviets assumed that if such a strategy was
successful, Moscow's international prestige would be greatly
enhanced, particularly given the radicalization of Chinese
policy during the cultural revolution (1966-1969) » and the
impudence of U.S. foreign policy as characterized by
239America's continued involvement m Vietnam. " As far as
a Persian Gulf strategy, Moscow realized that even without
a strong Western presence its ability to establish a strong
presence was limited by the lack of both regional bases and
a truly "blue water" navy.
For the most part, Iran remained unaware of the rationale
behind the Brezhnev-Kosygin strategy. Iran recognized that
a post-Khruschev change in Soviet strategy had occured, but
mistakenly assumed that Moscow's objective was to replace
London as the high sheriff of the Persian Gulf. Subsequent
Soviet activities were interpreted by Tehran as part of a
Russian effort to gain control of the gulf by enveloping its




2^0piercing the Caucasus and Iran. Moscow's support to
Egypt, Iraq, and the PDRY certainly fostered and exacerbated
this perception. It was several years before Iranian foreign
policy reflected an appreciation for the real objectives of
the Brezhnev-Kosygin strategy in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean
region. This perception was a reflection of a natural Iranian
tendency, born of a centuries-old adversarial relationship with
its northern neighbor, to succumb to recurring spells of
"Glubbitis," a form of paranoia afflicting several Western
as well as Middle Eastern regimes in which the victim
attributes every political setback, military defeat, economic
crisis, and natural disaster to a Russian conspiracy.
By 1971 Iran had developed a more cohesive policy toward
the Persian Gulf. As noted previously, the major obstacle
preventing the formation of such a policy, Iran's revanchist
position vis a vis Bahrain, was diplomatically overcome in
1970. Although Iran had supported the concept of a multi-
lateral gulf security pact, such a concept failed to germinate
due to Western "sponsorship" and Arab uncertainty over Iranian
intentions. Another factor hampering Arab-Iranian cooperation
9/4.0
Interview with Prof. Rouhollah K. Ramazani , Woodrow
Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, University
of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, 19 April 1978.
See P. J. Vatikiotis, "The Soviet Union and Egypt: The
Nasser Years," in The Soviet Union and the Middle East , ed.
by Ivo J. Lederer and Wayne S. Vucinich (Stanford: 197*0. P- 2.
13*+

was the Iranian demand that, as a quid pro quo for Iran's
acceptance of a federation of Arab gulf states, the other
littoral states would not oppose Iran's occupation of certain
gulf ' islands strategically located near the Straits of Hormuz.
Shortly before Britain's scheduled withdrawal, Iranian
military forces seized Abu Musa and the Tumbs . This action
epitomized the essential thrust of Iran's gulf policy: the
Shah and his government had determined that Iran should become
"the logical heir to Britain's former position of pre-
2^2
eminence.'' Although Iran had reached an agreement with
the Sheik of Sharjah--who claimed sovereignty over Abu Musa
—
prior to the move, whereby Iran agreed to compensate Sharjah
for the "occupation, ' no such agreement was made with the
claimant of the Tumbs, Ras al-Khaymah. Forces from Ras al-
Khaymah resisted the Iranian landing, and three Iranian and
four Arab troops were killed in the brief battle which
24-3
resulted. J Iran's action generated a hostile response
from several Arab quarters. Iraq broke off diplomatic
relations with both Iran and Great Britain, whom Baghdad
blamed as a co-conspirator in the Iranian take-over. Libya
seized the opportunity to nationalize all of British Petro-
leum's holding within its territory. Iraq, Libya, Algeria, Ras
al-Khaymah, and the PDRY all recommended Security Council
action. In an effort to asuage Arab criticism of its action,
7h?
D.C. Watt, "Persian Gulf—Cradle of Conflict?" Problems
of Communism
. 21 (May/June 1972) , p. 32.
^Shapour Nemazee, :'Islands return to Iran," Keyhan
International
, 1 December 1971. P« 1«
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Iran recognized the Union of Arab Emirates on 9 December
oLlU
1971. A stronger response from the U.N. , the U.S. and
perhaps even the Soviet Union was mitigated by a greater
concern with the international implications of the simul-
taneous renewal of the Indo -Pakistani conflict.
As Iran's reliance on force of arms to resolve its claim
to the gulf islands clearly indicates, the primary ingredient
in the post-1968 gulf strategy of the Shah was the build-up
of the Iranian military. The Shah assumed for Iran the
burden of providing security for not only the maritime and
petroleum activities in the gulf but also for preserving the
conservative Islamic (i.e. monarchial) character of gulf
politics. Subsequent Iranian military support to the Sultan
of Oman against the Dhofari rebels exemplified the militar-
istic character of the Shah's strategy. The Shah personally
affirmed this aspect of Iranian foreign policy during an
2^5
"interview' with an Iranian newspaper reporter in 1973-
Further evidence of the nature of Iran's gulf policy is
provided by a look at the character of Iran's military
equipment purchases from 1968-1972. Following Britain's
withdrawal announcement in early 1968, Iran received per-
mission from the Johnson administration to purchase the F^-
Phantom fighter-bomber, an aircraft of such sophistication
ptih.
See Chubin and Zabih, pp. 229-230.
2
-%ee Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy, 19^1-1973 > P- 352
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that, at the time, it had not been released to any country
outside of NATO, including Israel. Iran took delivery of
32 Phantoms just prior to the seizure of the islands in the
Straits of Hormuz. From the time of London's announcement
until the island operation, Iran also purchased ^0 additional
(16 had been purchased previously) CI30 long range transport
aircraft and 26 additional (91 were purchased in 1965) F5A
fighters. In order to deploy ground forces quickly across
the gulf, Iran purchased 126 Agusta-Bell helicopters and
ten British hovercraft during the same time frame. In
addition, Iran organized a marine brigade to serve as a
2^6
quick reaction force in the gulf. Elements of this unit
transported in hovercraft and helicopters seized the two
island groups in December 1971.
D. IRANIAN-SOVIET COMPETITION IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND BEYOND
As Iran was in the process of developing a Persian Gulf
policy, a simultaneous parallel effort was under way to
revise Iranian foreign policy in general to reflect the
changes in the international, regional, and domestic environ-
ment which had occured during the '60s. In this manner Iran
hoped to bring its newly emergent gulf policy into closer
alignment with its overall foreign policy. It would appear,
in retrospect, that the Iranian effort to develop a more
realistic and timely foreign policy included a reassessment
of its basic policies toward the superpowers. Subsequent
Iranian diplomacy, for example, reflected a more objective
2Z|6A11 arms sales data extracted from the SIPRI Arms Trade
Register (Cambridge, MA: 1975) > PP- ^6-50.
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appreciation of Moscow's actual interests in the region,
particularly as far as China was concerned. Iran also
attempted to balance its increased military and economic
ties with the West by demonstrating increased sensitivity
to Soviet interests, as exemplified by its opposition to
2^7
the U.S. base in Bahrain. By weaving these two efforts
together, Iran hoped to "neutralize" the Soviet position
in the region.
One of the fundamental objectives of Iran's post-1970
policy was the normalization of relations with the PRC . As
early as 19&9 » "the Shah had confirmed this goal of Iranian
policy when he stated that "although we do not recognize the
People's Republic of China, we believe that China must be
2^8
admitted into the United Nations." Later in 1971 » prior
to the outbreak of the third Indo-Pakistani conflict, the
Shah's sisters made separate trips to China to explore first-
hand the possibility of establishing full diplomatic relations
between the two Asian powers. When that final step was taken
just before the British withdrawal from the gulf, Iran added
a China card to its collection of diplomatic accouterments.
An airline agreement was signed by the two countries in 1972
followed by a trade agreement the following year. During the
visit of the Chinese foreign minister to Tehran in June 1973
»
China announced its unqualified support for Iranian policy
'Chub in and Zabih, p. 263.
Oh Q
Reported in Keyhan , 6 Sept. 19&9. as Quoted by Ramazani
,





objectives in the region. ' Of even greater significance
was the Tehran visit last year of the architect of China's
post-Mao policy, Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng. * This move
by Iran, which was essentially a return to Iran's previous
policy of seeking a third power to counter-balance its
relationship with the Soviet Union and the U.S. , may yet
prove, as several observers have noted, an effective mechanism
for preventing the further polarization of the Persian Gulf/
2 51
Indian Ocean area. J
Another goal of Iranian foreign policy after 1971 was
the reconstitution of the regional balance which Tehran
believed was upset hy the dismemberment of Pakistan in the
252
third Indo-Pakistani war. ^ Increased Soviet arms sales to
India in the late '60s and early '70s was seen in Tehran as a
significant factor in the resumption of hostilities between New
Delhi and Islamabad. In 1967 India became the first country
outside of the Warsaw Pact to be licensed by Moscow to produce
the MIG-21 fighter. Between 1968 and 1971, Moscow also
delivered 150 SU-7B fighter-bombers to India. -^ Because New
2^9Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy. 19^1-1973, p. ^32.
2 50J See Geoffrey Godsell, "Hua visit spotlights Irans key
role," The Christian Science Monitor , 30 August 1978, p. 1.
2 51See Chubin and Zabih, p. 298; and Alexander MacLeod,
''Shahof the Indian Ocean?" Pacific Community , Vol. 7, no. 3
(April 1976) , p. k2k.
2^2See C. L. Sulzberger, "Belief in 'Crude Reality,"* New




Dehli signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with
Moscow prior to the outbreak of war, Iran viewed the treaty
as another indication that Moscow would attempt to implement
its policy objectives in the region indirectly by working
through indigenous surrogates. Iran refrained from openly
criticizing the Soviet role in the conflict, however, due
to Moscow's staging of a military show of force along the
Soviet-Iranian border, after hostilities had begun, in an
effort to prevent Iran from aiding Pakistan. -' As it
happened, the Soviet maneuver was unnecessary since the U.S.
prohibited Iran from transferring arms to Pakistan. '-'
Iranian concern with Soviet intentions in the region was
intensified the following year when Moscow signed a formal
treaty with Iraq. Realizing that the treaty could hamper
Soviet-Iranian relations, Moscow went to great lengths to
assure Iran that: (a) the treaty was the result of an Iraqi,
and not a Russian, initiative, and (b) the increased military
aid which Moscow would provide to Iraq under the terms of
the treaty was not intended for use against Iran. The sub-
sequent Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
discussed previously was part of the Kremlin effort to assuage
Iranian "S-ensxtivi ties . Perhaps in an effort to further con-
vince Iran of its non-hostile intentions, Soviet arms
deliveries to Iraq from the signing of the treaty in April
2
^ Chubin and Zabih, p. 84.
2=)=)




'72 until the October War were limited to a handful of
additional MIG-21s, the Styx anti-ship missile system, and
2k SA-3 SAMs. 256
Events in 1973 further exacerbated Iranian apprehension
of a surrogate offensive by Moscow in the area. Soviet-made
weapons were discovered in the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad in
February. According to Pakistani officials, the arms were
destined for the Baluchi Liberation Front, a group seeking
to establish an independent Baluchistan from the Baluchi
areas of Pakistan and Iran. Five months later the conser-
vative monarchy in Afghanistan was overthrown by a former
prime minister, Sardar Baud Khan. Initially, Iran viewed
the Daud coup as a de-stabilizing factor since: (1) during
his previous tenure as prime minister Daud had played a key
role in improving Afghan-Soviet relations; (2) Daud had been
a principle advocate of the incorporation of all Pushto
speaking areas under an Afghan authority (Pakistan has a
large Pushto population); and (3) in the wake of the '71
Indo-Pakistani war, Iran had attempted to improve its
relations with Afghanistan, an effort which Tehran feared
2 c$7
might be jeopardized by the coup in Kabul. Ji For the
time being, however, Iranian apprehension over the situation
in Afghanistan proved to be unfounded.
256SIPRI, p. 51.





By 1972 Iran had developed a new outlook on regional
affairs. Regarding its relationship with the Soviet Union,
Iran was determined to avoid actions which might unduly
arouse the ire of the Kremlin, while simultaneously :'social-
izing" the Soviets through increased technical cooperation
and economic relations. As the Shah is reported to have
stated in late 1971. "the Russians have for centuries wanted
to find a way to the Persian Gulf, but now they have abandoned
subversive methods /because^ we have provided them with a
way to realize their dreams --thro ugh roads, railways, and
the oil pipeline; in other words, through usiness and mutual
profits." Iranian strategy vis a vis the Soviets also
called for a diplomatic and economic offensive to "neutralize"
Soviet influence in the region. In the area of Iranian-
American relations, Tehran hoped to balance its growing
military and economic dependency on Washington by assuming a
more neutral posture in international forums such as the
U.N. and OPEC while diversifying, when possible, its weapons
purchase from non-U. S. sources. In regard to this latter
objective, from 1971-1973 Iran purchased helicopters from
Italy and France, transport aircraft from the Netherlands,
259
and SAMs , frigates, and tanks from Britain. -" Tehran's gulf
policy after 1971 continued, as before, to emphasize Iran as
the regional successor to the British role as the gendarme of the
^ From an article by Eric Rouleau in the Manchester
Guardian Weekly
.





area. As such, Iran persisted in its appeal for the de-
polarization of the gulf, and continued its program of
military expansion.
One significant change did occur, however, in Iranian
strategy after 1971. The Shah announced in November 1972
that the national interests of Iran extended "far beyond its
own immediate region." reaching into the Gulf of Oman and
Arabian Sea beyond the Straits of Hormuz. Accordingly,
the Shah promised to further increase the "striking power"
of the Iranian military, particularly its naval capability.
A subsequent editorial in Kavhan explained that the Shah's
decision was necessitated by regional instability and by
increased Soviet activity in the area. While acknowledging
that the Soviet Union was "neither in a position nor urgently
interested in getting involved in a nineteenth century style
power struggle in the Indian Ocean," the article surmised
that Kremlin strategy was designed to "encircle China while
also holding Western trade interests in ransom. " The
article concluded by predicting that future Iranian strategy
in the region would "seek a position from which it will be
261
able to operate much further afield. " Iranian arms pur-
chases after 1971 directly supported the extension of Iran's
interests into the Arabian Sea, including 10 ASW helicopters,
Text of Shah's statement in Kayhan , weekly English ed.
,
11 Nov. 1972, as quoted by Ramazani, Iran's ForeiTtn Policy,
19^1-1973
, p. ^28.
26lEditorial in Kayhan , weekly English ed. , 18 Nov. 1972,
as quoted by Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy, 19^-1-1973 , p. ^28
m-3

15 maritime surveillance aircraft, 60 ship-launched missiles,
^ frigates, 3 destroyers, and 6 missile patrol coats.
Realizing that the extension of Iranian naval and air
operations into the Arabian Sea would require additional
land based support facilities , Iran arranged for naval
facilities on Mauritius and developed a plan to construct a
joint naval and air base at Chah Bahar on the Gulf of Oman.
While Iran's strategy beyond the Persian Gulf signaled the
emergence of a more complex, scopious, and assertive foreign
policy, it also rivaled Soviet policy objectives in the
region. Within the gulf area itself, Kremlin strategy was
fairly simple and straightforward: (l) reduce Western (par-
ticularly U.S.) influence in the area ^ by supporting efforts
designed to: (a) "demilitarize" the gulf, (b) transfer
26 ^
control of gulf resources from Western to indigenous companies,
and (c) develop friendly relations between Moscow and the




gulf; and, 3) promote Soviet-gulf trade and technical
cooperation.
262SIPRI, pp. 47-^9.
263^See Oles M. Smolansky, "Soviet Policy in the Persian
Gulf," in Soviet Naval Policy , ed. by Michael Mec Gwire et
al (New York: 1975) , p. 279-
26
^See Hensel, pp. 72^-726.
265Ibid.
, pp. 726-727.
See Watt, pp. 32-^0; see also Bettie and O.M. Smolansky




Outside of the confines of the gulf itself, however,
Soviet strategy took on more of a confrontational character.
Foremost in this regard was Moscow's determination to prevent
the deployment of U.S. strategic forces in the Indian Ocean.
The second objective in Soviet strategy was the continuance of
amicable relations between Moscow and the progressive regimes
in the region. Of particular interest to Moscow, in this
regard, was the preservation of the Soviet position in India.
The Kremlin resented Iran's successful post-1971 campaign to
promote Indo-Iranian regional cooperation through such
mechanisms as a common market, joint armament production,
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and joint patrolling of the Indian Ocean. y Moscow viewed
the ascendence of a Western-backed Iran embarking on a
grandiose plan to become "the Japan of the Near East" as a
potential threat to Soviet interests in the region. Soviet
anxiety was exacerbated by the scope of the Iranian military
Smolansky in Mc Gwire
, pp. i+78-479.
269^See Mohan Ram, "Indian anxious over impact of turmoil
in Iran," The Christian Science Monitor , 28 December 1978, p.
!4-. More recently, Moscow blamed the downfall of the pro-
Soviet Gandhi government on interference from "western 1
governments. Soviet anxiety was increased further when the
Desai government restructured Indian foreign and- defense
policies in an effort to put more distance between Indian and
the Soviet Union. India has subsequently concluded an arms
deal with London for Jaguar and Harrier aircraft, rebuffing a
Soviet offer for MIG- 23s on better terms. Prime Minister Desai ' s
government has also been very critical of the invasion of
Cambodia by Moscow's allies in Hanoi.
1^5

buildup, especially after the Nixon administration granted
the Shah a virtual carte "blanche in 1972 to purchase any U.S.
non-nuclear weapons system. Even before the Shah's post-73
buying spree, Moscow recognized that Iran's acquisition of
such sophisticated weaponry as the Fl4, Boeing air-refueling
tankers, and British "SAAM" class frigates gave Iran a
capability to project power beyond the Arabian Sea, much less
the Persian Gulf. Tehran's port facilities agreements with
Mauritius and South Africa only confirmed Soviet suspicion
that Iran was intent on becoming a major military power in the
region, and therefore a potential challenge to Soviet
270interests. Some elements within the Soviet elite also
may have seen in the Iranian push into the Indian Ocean an
American strategy designed to "beat" Moscow at its own game,
i.e. to use the Shah and his military as a surrogate instru-
ment of U.S. foreign policy much the same as the Kremlin had
attempted to do with Castro in Latin America (and more
recently in Africa) , with Nasser in the Middle East, and with
271Hanoi in East Asia.
While the Soviets felt no immediate threat from Iran's
buildup from 68-73* "the ability and willingness of the Shah
to expend the resources necessary to develop Iran into a
270See Fred Halliday. Iran: Dictatorship and Development .
(New York: 1979) , p. 262.
271Shahram Chubin, "The International Politics of the
Persian Gulf," British Journal of International Studies , Vol.
2 (October 1976) , p. 221.
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significant regional actor over a 50 year period certainly
challenged the Kremlin's regional strategy. Moscow's goal
of a Finlandized Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean could be
countered just as effectively by the rise of a powerful
regional actor as by a large Western presence in the area.
E. IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE POST-7^ SOVIET OFFENSIVE
IN THE THIRD WORLD
No apparent evidence exists to indicate that Iran either
intended or realized that its regional strategy might be
interpreted by the Kremlin as a potential threat to Soviet
interests. On the contrary, existing evidence indicated
that Iran assumed that its China policy and regional strategy
would be viewed by Moscow as logical and necessary steps by
Tehran to achieve a more neutral position vis a vis both
272 . . .
superpowers. Iran relied primarily on trade and limited
technical cooperation to engender a benign attitude from
Moscow. As far as its military buildup was concerned, Iran
continued to view Soviet security interests in a traditional
framework, i.e. that since (a) Russia had been concerned
historically with a land based threat from the region, and
(b) even a modernized Iran would never pose a significant
land threat to the Soviet Union, therefore (c) Moscow would
be irritated with, but not threatened by, Iranian arms
purchases.
272See Chubin and Zabih, pp. 297-298.
1^7

Where Iranian policy ran afoul of Kremlin strategy was
in failing to appropriately interpret and assess Soviet
regional objectives. Moscow identified the regional threat
in terms of the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, not in terms
of a land-based threat. In addition, Soviet strategy called
for the "demilitarization" of the PG/IO area, a call which
the Shah, with U.S. and Chinese support, was not only ignoring,
but in fact actively countering. Furthermore, Iran viewed
Soviet interests in the region as a unique aspect of Kremlin
foreign policy, probably due at least in part to Moscow's
persistent refusal to allow its activities in the Third
World to become linked to detente. In reality, however,
Soviet strategy in the region was linked to other consider-
ations: not to detente, but rather, as the following
discussion will show, to Soviet objectives in Asia and the
27 3Eastern Mediterranean sub-region of the Middle East. J
The burgeoning oil revenues which resulted from the 400%
rise in oil prices in the aftermath of the October War created
a powerful economic dimension to Iran's regional strategy. In-
creased oil revenues, which skyrocketed from $2.4- billion
in 1972 to $17-4 billion in 1974, provided Iranian leaders
with an economic mechanism never before available. Iran
bolstered its stature in Europe by heavily investing in
several European industries , increased its purchases of
European goods and services, and even negotiated loans to
27




European governments. Within the PG/IO region, Iran concluded
an arrangement with India which provided Iranian oil on credit
terms in return for assurances from Mrs. Gandhi that India
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would assume a less hostile posture toward Pakistan,
a deal which concomitantly lessened the importance of Soviet
oil shipments to India. Through the use of foreign aid,
Iran also enhanced its relationships with Afghanistan, Egypt,
and Somalia.
On the diplomatic front, Iranian foreign policy reflected,
after 1973* a. level of sophistication and realism heretofore
unknown in the annals of Iranian diplomacy. Perhaps the
most notable achievements in this context were the intervention
in Oman from 1973-76 and the successful negotiation in 1975
of an end to Iran's long-standing feud with Iraq. Tehran also
continued to explore ways of improving regional cooperation.
Although the Arab states remained unenthusiastic about Iranian
proposals for a gulf security pact, considerable interest
was created in the development of a regional arms industry. ' J
Iran also leant its diplomatic weight to U.S. efforts to
bring about a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, and to
multilateral efforts to deal with the Lebanese quagmire.
27 Chubin, "Iran's Foreign Policy 1960-1976," p. 354.
27 *5
' ^See Roger Mitchell, "Country Keen to Develop Arms
Industry," Tehran Journal , 28 March 1978, p. 3; see also
Shahram Chubin, "Iran's Security in the 1980's, :: International
Security , Vol. 2, No. 3 (Winter 1978), p. 63.
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The seven-plus-fold increase in Iranian oil revenues in
197^ resulted in a "the sky is the limit" attitude in Iran
towards arms purchases. Subsequent orders included several
systems capable of substantially increasing (qualitatively
as well as quantitatively) Iran's long range strike capability,
Included within this category of weaponry were orders for:
four Spruance class destroyers, six Lupo class frigates, six
209 class submarines, twelve fast patrol boats with Harpoon
missiles, 177 additional F^E fighter/bombers, seven additional
Boeing refueling tankers, thirty-nine additional P-3C mari-
time reconnaissance aircraft, and an advanced airborne
warning system (AWACS). At one point, Iran even considered
the future purchase of up to three aircraft carriers for use
in the Indian Ocean. Aside from the exponential increase in
weaponry itself, Tehran demonstrated a greater willingness
after 1973 "t° put its new and expanded military into actual
use. In 1973 the Shah admitted for the first time that
Iranian forces were operating in Oman against the Dhofari
rebels. Not long afterward, the size of the Iranian force
in Oman was substantially increased, to the point where by
1976 the rebellion had been effecitvely crushed. The Kurdish
uprising against the Iraqi Ba'thists in 197^ presented Iran
with another opportunity for military intervention. Although
in this instance regular ground and air forces were not
involved, Iranian paramilitary and CIA personnel were support-
ing the Pesh Merga. In addition, Iranian artillery and air
27 Data extracted from SIPRI, The Military Balance ,
1978-79, (London: 1979), p. 37-
150

defense units operating near the Iraqi border provided
coverage for Kurdish forces in Iraq.
Soviet machinations in the region during the post-73
period were of sufficient magnitude—had the Iranian leader-
ship been receptive to these attempts by Moscow to telegraph
its displeasure with Iranian policy--as to have indicated
clearly a need for a less assertive Iranian strategy in the
region, given Tehran's desire to refrain from actions which
might be interpreted by Moscow as a challenge to its interests
For example, when a second cache of Soviet-made arms was
discovered in Pakistan in 197^> again linked to the Baluchi
insurgents, Iran viewed the event solely in terms of an Iraqi
effort to stir up trouble for Iran in Baluschistan in order
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to pressure Iran into withdrawing its support to the Kurds.
Had Iran been more sensitive to Moscow's interests, it might
have deduced that the Soviet weapons, which were easily
captured by the Pakistanis, were intended as a warning from
the Kremlin that Iran's support for the Kurds placed the
Kremlin in a very tenuous and embarassing position, since
Moscow had been attempting to mediate between the Ba'ath and
the Kurds for some time.
^R.. M. Burrell and Alvin J. Cottrell, Iran, Afghanistan ,
Pakistan: Tensions and Dilemmas (Beverly Hills , CA: 197*0 » P-8
27 See "Goodwill Visit by Soviet Delegation," Pravda , 3
Dec. 1973, as trans, in CDSP, Vol. 25, no. 4-8, pp. 20-21.
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When Iran expanded its support to Oman's Dhofar campaign,
Moscow—which had previously refrained from criticizing Iran
directly—unleashed a media campaign, using PFLO and Arab
279
reports, against the Iranian intervention. l7 In 1975 "the
Kremlin staged a major Indian Ocean exercise, including a
force of 15 combatants. Although possible in response to
Iranian and Western intervention in Oman, the naval maneuver
was clearly a manifestation of Moscow's concern over increased
U.S. activity in the area and the "blue water" implications
of Iran's military expansion program.
If one crucial weakness in Iranian foreign policy was
its inability to appropriately interpret Soviet actions,
another deficiency was the failure of Iran's policy-makers to
properly examine Soviet regional interests vis a vis Soviet
policy objectives as a whole, and in particular the linkages
between Soviet policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and Africa,
the PG/lO , and the Far East. Iran's post-73 foreign policy,
for instance, failed to account for the chaotic state of
Moscow's policy in all three regions in the wake of the
October War. Washington's step-by-step diplomacy relegated
Moscow from a role of active participation to one of outside
observation, a fait acompli which the Kremlin greatly resented.
Furthermore, Washington's post-war hysteria about a Soviet
threat to Western oil interests in the Persian Gulf threatened
to spark a full-scale superpower buildup in the Indian Ocean,
something which the Soviets had long sought to avoid. The
279Hensel, p. 887; see also "The People of Dhofar Fight
On," New Times , No. 18119 (May 197*0. pp. 25-29-
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U.S. expanded the naval and air facilities on Diego Garcia
and, following the CENTO naval exercise in November 197^,
deployed an aircraft carrier task force from the Philippines
to the area on a regular "basis. When Egypt unilaterally
abrogated its treaty with the Soviet Union in 1976, the Kremlin
lost its only naval and air facilities in the Eastern Med-
iterranean. In East Asia, Moscow's hopes for the Russif ication
of Indochina in the aftermath of the American withdrawal were
soon shattered when the pro-Chinese Khemer Rouge gained
control of Cambodia in 1975-
In retrospect, it would appear that 1975 was a crucial
year in Soviet foreign policy. At some point the Kremlin
apparently decided in favor of the old military addage which
states that "the best defense is a good offense." The issue-
area which Moscow selected for its Third World counter-attack
was Angola. Banking on a general American apathy for
African issues—further atrophied by Vietnam and Watergate--
yet still hesitant to commit Soviet combat forces directly,
the Kremlin willingly championed the installation by their
Cuban surrogates of a pro-Soviet regime in Luanda. Closer
to home, Soviet-Turkish relations were boosted as a result
of the U.S. aid cut-off to Turkey, which went into effect
in February 1975- In the Persian Gulf, Moscow reacted to
the increased U.S. and Iranian activity in the Indian Ocean
by attaching a protocol to its treaty with Iraq giving the
Soviets "unlimited" access to the Iraqi naval base at Uiran
153

Qasr.~ Soviet naval capabilities in the Arabian Sea also
were greatly enhanced by the construction in Berbera, Somalia
of "the most elaborate sea and air facilities outside the
pQ"|
'Warsaw Pact." Although subsequent Iranian and Saudi
petro-dollar diplomacy played a significant role in weaning
Somalia away from the Soviets, Moscow's successful venture
in Ethiopia following their ouster from Somalia in November
OQ p
1977 resulted in a tit for tat exchange. In fact, Moscow's
position in Ethiopia today is stronger and more extensive
than its former arrangement in Somalia. ^ In April of last
year (1978), the Tariki coup in Afghanistan was a giant step
forward toward the achievement by the Soviets of a Finland-
284ized southern flank. So crucial is Afghanistan in the
Kremlin's southern strategy that Moscow has responded with
uncharacteristic vehemence to reports that Iran, China, and
Lawrence Whetten, "The Military-Strategic Balance,'' in
The Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean in International Politics ,
ed. by Abbas Amirie (Tehran: 1975), p. 97-
Ibid.
PR ?
See "Iranian Interests in the Horn of Africa," Iran
Political Digest , 29 January 1978, pp. 2-9, in JPRS Near East
and North Africa , no. 1769, 14 March 1978, pp. 49-54.
28%ee David K. Willis, "Soviets firm up toehold in Horn,"
Christian Science Monitor
. 21 November 1978, p. 3.
284See Kevin Rafferty, "Afghanistan: the Soviet Union's
highway to the Indian Ocean," The Manchester Guardian , 119:2
(9 July 1978) , p. 8.
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Pakistan are supporting an Islamic guerrilla campaign in the
rural areas of the country. At this time it also appears
that the Chinese threat to Moscow's position in East Asia
has been effectively eliminated by the Kremlin's Vietnamese
allies. By 1979. therefore, the Kremlin had made considerable
progress toward redressing the foreign policy setbacks of the
early 70' s.
Regarding Soviet concern over the potential for a future
clash of Russian and Iranian interests in the region, Moscow
refrained from directly challenging Iran's PG/IO strategy.
Soviet restraint was due probably to the Kremlin's perception
that such action would engender an overwhelming American
response, particularly in light of Washington's often
demonstrated paranoia concerning possible threats to its
petroleum interests in the region. Moscow could not,
however, remain apathetic about Iran's interference in Soviet
activities in southern Arabia, the Horn, and Afghanistan.
Although no evidence has as yet surfaced implicating Moscow
directly in the recent Iranian revolution, the two Arab
entities who have been the focus of Moscow's keenest attention
in the Arab World over the past five years— the Palestinians
and the Libyans—were both involved up to their kef iyyas in
aiding the various anti-regime forces in Iran. Palestinian
support to Iranian dissidents, particularly training, dates
28
^"Soviets lash at Afghanistan's Muslim foes," The
Christian Science Monitor , 20 March 79, P- 3; and David K.
Willis, "Soviets fret over Muslim neighbors," The Christian
Science Monitor , 11 April 79, P- 5-
2
^^See Joseph C. Harsch, "Soviet military machine: huge but
hamstrung," The Christian Science Monitor , 5 January 79, p. 22.
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from the early seventies. In January of this year Ahmed
Jibril , the leader of the PFLP-GC , confirmed that his organ-
ization had been aiding Iranian activitists since 1970.
Although Jibril did not elaborate, most of his organization's
support probably went to the Fedayeen-e Khalq. Like the
Jibril faction, the Iranian Fedayeen are Marxists, and their
involvement in the Iranian revolution bespoke of a higher
degree of training and organizational cohesiveness than other
revolutionary groups. Although the Palestinians provided
the manpower and the expertise for training the Iranians,
Jibril ' s operations were financed by the two Arab countries
with the closest ties (at this time) with Moscow, i.e. Iraq
288
and Libya. In addition to the longstanding ties between
the Palestinian and Iranian radicals, support from the more
moderate Palestinians of Al -Fatah to the Islamic forces of
Ayatollah Khomeni , the Mujahideen-e Islam, apparently began
sometime in 1977 following a meeting in Lebanon between the
28 9Ayatollah and Yasir Arafat.
287
'See Ned Temk.o, "Arms aid for Iran's opposition admitted
by Palestinian leader," The Christian Science Monitor . 2h Jan
79, p. 6.
288
For a breakdown of financial support to the various
Palestinian groups see William 3. Quandt- et al , The Politics
of Palestinian Nationalism (Los Angeles: 1973) » P- 66.
28 97See "A real base for the PLO? , " The Middle East
(March 1979) , p. 30.
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Nothing in the discussion above was meant to convey an
impression that Moscow somehow " engineered'' the Iranian
revolution. On the contrary, all available evidence indicates
that (a) the revolution was essentially a popular rejection
of the authoritarianism, repression, and corruption of the
Pahlavi regime, and (b) that the Soviets have been as concerned
as the U.S. about the foreign policy implications of the
revolution. What this section attempted to do, however, was
demonstrate that: (l) Moscow had reason to view with favor
any element in Iranian politics which, like the Soviets,
objected to Iran's self -assumed role as the regional gendarme,
(2) it is inconceivable that the Kremlin was not aware of
radical Arab support to Iranian opposition forces, and (3)
tacit Soviet support to the Iranian revolutionaries may have
taken on a more positive character as the Shah began to take
direct steps to counter Soviet policy in Oman, India,
Somalia, and Afghanistan. Furthermore, Moscow's initial low-
profile approach to the Iranian revolution should not be
construed as an adoption by the Kremlin of a laissez faire
attitude toward the present situation in Iran. A new
communist movement in Iran, the National Communist Party, is
filling an ideological void among younger Iranians necessitated
by the widespread rejection of the old party, the Tudeh, for
290its past subservience to Moscow. It is as yet too early
290See Geoffrey Godsell, "In Iran, malaise challenges




to determine whether the NCP is truly a "national" party
on a Euro communist model or an actual Soviet-linked front
organization. The rise of such a group is, as Professor
Ramazani recently noted, however, indicative of increased
Soviet activity among the leftist factions of the Iranian
291
revolution.
2917 Rouhollah Ramazani, "Security in the Persian Gulf,"




Iran's foreign policy of the past decade and a half has
been systemically and substantively different from its
traditional predecessors. As the first chapter of this
study notes, traditional Iranian foreign policy was conducted
in a framework which balanced the monarch and the traditional
elites--the aristocracy, tribal leaders, bureaucrats, and the
religious hierarchy--in mutually supporting roles. These
traditional policy makers viewed external issues and events
through a complex image pattern which incorporated both geo-
political and socio-cultural frames of reference. The end
result was an Iranian perception of an outside world which
was essentially hostile and an Iranian foreign policy which
was primarily defensive in nature. Under the last two rulers,
however, the monarchy acquired an unprecedented degree of
power within Iranian society. By developing a large standing
army equipped with increasingly sophisticated equipment, the
Pahlavi Shahs were able to break the traditional dependency
of the monarchy on support from the tribes and the aristocracy.
The so-called White Revolution of Mohammed Reza Shah was an
attempt to eliminate the landlords and the ulema from their
traditional positions of influence in policy-making. Failure
to develop secular institutional replacements for these social
institutions, particularly the socio-economic functions of
the Shia Islamic institutions, alienated both the ulema and
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the masses as well. At the same time that the monarchy was
attempting to restructure the foundation of Iranian society,
it was continuing in its effort to consolidate its control
over the coercive mechanisms of the state. This consolidation
of power under the monarchy enabled the Shah to exercise
absolute control over the distribution of the country's grow-
ing oil wealth. As a result the Shah and his advisors became
increasingly isolated from the intense hostility developing
within Iranian society.
In addition to systemic changes in the traditional Iranian
policy-making apparatus, Iran's foreign policy was also affected
by changes in the international environment. Iran's historically
based third-power policy—which had attempted to temper the
adverse effects of the Anglo-Russian great power rivalry in
Iran by developing ties with a third power, such as France,
Germany, or the U.S. --was ill-suited to the bi-polar nature
of post-WWII international relations. Iran, therefore, opted
for formal membership in a Western alliance as the best means
of preventing a Soviet take-over, a threat which had manifested
itself twice in this century. By the early 60s the inter-
national system was again subjected to centrifugal forces as
the bi-polar character of the Cold War was diluted by the
Sino-Soviet rift and the rise of the Third World as a major
force in international relations. For its part, Iran became
increasingly dis-satisfied with the limited nature of the
Western commitment to Iranian security, particularly regarding
160

internal and non-Soviet threats. Therefore in 19&3 I;ran
attempted to develop a more neutral foreign policy which
would, it was hoped, reduce both its dependence on the U.S.
and, concomitantly, the Soviet threat. At the same time,
Iran increased its defense expenditures in an effort to
improve the regime's ability to defend itself against domes-
tic and regional threats. Although Iran's 'independent national
policy hardly went far toward moving Iran into a nonaligned
status, it did represent a significant departure from previous
Iranian foreign policy. In addition, in terms of its
philosophical objectives, it exemplified a degree of
sophistication and realism seldom observed in developing
nations. Once again, however, the independent national
policy was overtaken by events in the late 60s and early 70s
which forced Iran into a closer re-alignment with the West
and into playing a more active role in regional affairs.
As a result of the British withdrawal from the region and
the third Indo -Pakistani war, Iranian foreign policy became
even more assertive, particularly in the Persian Gulf. At
first, Iran concentrated on developing a military force
capable of filling the shoes of the British after their
departure in 1971- Iranian foreign policy in the gulf prior
to 1975 » therefore, reflected a tendency to rely on military
rather than diplomatic measures for handling problems in the
area. Iran did develop rather quickly, however, the cap-
ability to defend its interests in the gulf, and to police
the gulf air and sea routes as well. After 1971, Iran began
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to look increasingly to areas beyond the gulf--such as the
Indian subcontinent, the Arabian Sea, and the Horn of
Africa--as being within an expanded Iranian sphere of in-
terest. Iran's policy clashed with Moscow's strategy in
six areas: (1) Iranian support to the Kurdish rebellion
in Iraq, (2) the Shah's intervention in Oman, (3) Iranian
economic intervention in the Horn of Africa, (4) the Shah's
support for anti-regime activities in Afghanistan, (5) Tehran's
overtures to Peking, and (6) the long range implications of
the Iranian military build-up.
Although Moscow was concerned about Soviet-Iranian
competition in the region, there were several considerations
which recommended a cautious approach in Iran:
(1) the likelihood of any opposition movement succeeding
appeared hi gly improbable;
(2) the Kremlin's historical protege in Iran, the Tudeh
Party, had been rendered virtually ineffectual, both by its
own well-known subservience to Moscow and by the dilligent
efforts of the Shah's security apparatus;
(3) The embryonic opposition movement in Iran was heavily
embued with an Islamic-reformist character which, if it were
successful, could "spill over" into other areas, including
the Muslim republics of the Soviet Union;
(k) domestic upheaval in Iran could interrupt Soviet gas
and petroleum imports;
(5) at the first sign of Soviet involvement in any move




(6) even if the opposition succeeded in either reducing
the powers of, or replacing, the Shah, Moscow had no guarantees
that a successor government would adopt a foreign policy any
more advantageous to the Soviets than that of the Shah's
regime.
On the other hand, other elements within the Kremlin
hierarchy, such as those represented on the Middle East
Committee discussed in chapter III, probably encouraged the
PLO connection with the Iranian dissidents, arguing that:
(1) given the situation in (2) above, Soviet support for
anti-Shah forces was essential if Moscow hoped to have in
the future a viable political base in Iran;
(2) socio-economic conditions in Iran were ripe for
revolution; opposition to the regime was more widespread than
at any time since 1953;
(3) the Islamic overtones of the opposition movement
were more emotional than political, due to the nature of
the Iranian brand of Islam; the potential for "spill over"
into non-Persian and non-Shia areas would be minimal;
(^) interruptions in Soviet trade with Iran would not
be prolonged, given the need for any Iranian government to
maintain its revenue earning base;
(5) the U.S. would not intervene militarily unless the
Soviets were directly involved, hence the need for the PLO
link; should a popular revolution be successful, the U.S.
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and the West would be forced to deal with the new government
in order to insure continued access to Iranian oil;
(6) although a post-Shah regime might not be openly
pro-Soviet, the revolution would destroy the U.S. position
in Iran, which would in turn upset the balance of power in
the entire region, a situation which Moscow would be more
capable of exploiting than Washington;
(7) the initial post-revolutionary government in Iran
will be a weak transition government which will eventually be
replaced by a more progressive regime; this regime will in
turn adopt a foreign policy in line with Soviet objectives
in the region.
The situation in Iran in late 1978/early 1979 was so fluid,
with events moving so rapidly, that the cumbersome decision-
making apparatus in the Kremlin never had time to decide on
a particular policy before the revolution erupted in full
force. Moscow watched with considerable interest, however
when—as the Shah's increasingly autocratic and repressive
policies alienated more and more Iranians--the ranks of the
dissident movement swelled to the point where non-communist
activities cons"tituted the majority of the rank and file and
gained control of the leadership of the movement as well. The
movement coalesced around the figure of the Ayatollah Khomeni
,
the 78-year old leader of the Shia community and a long-time
opponent of the Shah. The Soviets at first maintained a
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cautious approach, but as the strength of the revolutionaries
became more apparent, Moscow stepped up its anti-regime
propaganda and intensified its efforts to establish ties with
the various opposition elements. For the Soviets, as for
most of the rest of the world, the collapse of the Pahlavi
regime came sooner than most thought possible. Given the
anti-communist doctrine of the new Islamic government, how-
ever, the Kremlin has continued its go-slow approach. A
great deal of uncertainty remains in the minds of the Soviet
leadership concerning the viability of the Islamic Republic
of the Ayatollah Khomeni and the foreign policy implications
of his post-Pahlavi regime.
If the Islamic Republic as envisioned by Ayatollah proves
to be a viable concept, the Soviets can expect several favor-
able developments in Iranian foreign policy. Iran announced
its withdrawal from CENTO in March. Future Western involve-
ment in Iranian military and economic affairs will be
drastically reduced. Oil revenues will be channeled into
economically productive areas such as agriculture, health and
welfare, light industry, and transportation, thereby curtailing
defense expenditures. By refusing to play a dominant role
in the Persian Gulf, Iran will attempt to encourage the
formation of a joint security arrangement by all the littoral
states. Within the context of the Arab-Israeli dispute,
Iran will support the establishment of a Palestinian state
and will reject the Camp David concept of negotiating peace.
On most international issues (North-South and East-West) Iran
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will attempt to solidly establish its credentials within
the nonaligned bloc. A source of contention between Iran
and the Soviet Union will continue to be Iran's willingness to
use its financial resources to oppose, and when necessary
combat, communist encroachment in any form within the region.
Where vital Soviet interests are at stake, as in the case of
Afghanistan, Moscow may feel compelled to retaliate by
supporting more actively the various secular forces which
have recently emerged in opposition to many of the policies
of the present government in Tehran.
Moscow should think twice about supporting a movement
to replace the Khomeni government with a more secular regime.
While the present government may be perplexing and at times
annoying to the Soviet, it is at present only a thorn in
Moscow's side not a dagger in its heart. While the Soviets
are concerned about "fallout" from the Iranian revolution,
their apprehension is primarily related to the potential for
similarly based revolutions in those regional countries ruled
by "progressive" regimes, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and
PDRY. Moscow appears much less concerned with the impact of
292the Iranian revolution on its own Muslim population. *
While suppressing the Islamic religion, the Soviet authorities
have actually encouraged Islamic cultural expression within
the Muslim republics, as in the arts, literature, and
2927 See David K. Willis, "Soviets see no Muslim threat,"
Christian Science Monitor




music. J Furthermore, the Soviets have consistently selected
talented individuals from the Muslim republics for service
in key Soviet diplomatic, trade, and intelligence activities
in the Middle East.
In the final analysis, the rise of a secular nationalist
regime might prove an even greater enigma to Moscow. Such
a regime could take one of three forms: (l) a return to one
man rule, (2) a parliamentary government controlled by a
social democratic party, similar to that of the present
National Front, or (3) a government controlled by a truly
national communist party, like the Euro -communist parties of
Italy and Spain.
Should the political situation in Iran deteriorate to the
point of total chaos or civil war, such as by the threatened
break-up of the Iranian nation into independent ethnic and
tribally-based units, Moscow might well find itself faced with
the emergence of a secular authoritarian ruler who brings
stability to the Iranian domestic scene, but who adopts a
foreign policy similar to that of the Shah. Such a leader
would undoubtedly be supported by the West and would in turn
re-establish close political and military ties with the West.
The Iranian military would be re-conditioned to assume its
former role as the gendarme of the region. In addition,
Western advisors and arms would return to Iran in significant
293
'^For an interesting, although slanted, comparison of
the treatment of Muslims in China and the Soviet Union see
Victor Louis, The Coming Decline of the Chinese Empire (New
York: 1979), pp. 88-96 and I978-I83.
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numbers. Under such leadership, Iran would resume its use
of petro-dollar diplomacy to combat radical change in the
area with renewed vigor.
If a social democratic government comes to power at some
future date, the Soviets might well find its foreign policy
almost as distasteful as that of the current regime. Such
a government, for example, would be more nationalistic (in a
Persian rather than Islamic sense of the meaning) and there-
fore more likely to support a leadership role for Iran in
the Persian Gulf. Accordingly, defense expenditures, while
reduced from their exhorbitant pre-revolutionary levels,
would continue to support the largest military force in the
gulf. Arms purchases would proceed on a more limited scale
from a wider variety of Communist-block and Western sources.
Purchases of Soviet-made weaponry would probably expand,
particularly for ships, missiles, and transport aircraft.
A token purchase of Chinese weapons probably would be made
as well. In addition, Eastern European, Chinese and Soviet
advisors would fill many formerly American advisory positions.
Meanwhile, a large (perhaps 10,000) contingent of Western
technicians and advisors would return to Iran. A major
project of a social democratic government in the defense
sector would be the development of an indigenous armaments
industry.
Much to Moscow's chagrin, a social democratic regime in
Tehran would adopt an assertive foreign policy. Although such
a government would not oppose any change per se in the political
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character of regional states, as did the Iranian monarchy, it
would continue to oppose any externally imposed or supported
change, as in Afghanistan, which could; (a) affect the
stability of the region as a whole, or (b) adversely affect
Iran's nonaligned position in international affairs. Iranian
opposition to the present regime in Kabul would not be on
ideological grounds, but rather Iran would use its considerable
economic clout to pressure the Tariki government into: (1)
reducing significantly the Soviet presence in Afghanistan,
(2) returning to a more neutral posture in foreign affairs,
and (3) building a broader domestic base of support for the
regime.
In addition, a social democratic government would work to
eliminate any non-littoral presense in the PG/IO region.
Although the probability of such an effort succeeding would
be limited, this stand would improve Iran's credentials among
the non-aligned states, and would draw Iran, India , and China
closer together. Iran would be more successful at promoting
Indo-Iranian cooperation in the areas of defense, industrial-
ization, trade, and nuclear research. In addition, a social
democratic government would use its economic resources to
reduce further India's dependency on the Soviet Union.
In spite of what may seem to be highly improbable at
this time, the eventual emergence of a communist controlled
government cannot be discounted. Such an eventuality is
usually ruled out by analysts observing events in Islamic
countries, due to the generally accepted incompatability of
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communism and Islam, which are viewed as antipathetical
ideologies. This observation, which as assumed an almost
theoretical dimension, is based on the juxtaposition of the
terets of Islam with the precepts of Marxism-Leninism.
Coexistence between the two philosophies is impossible be-
cause both (in theory) demand the total allegiance of the
individual and (again in theory) establish total control over
all the institutions of society. National communism, as
practicsed by the Eurocommunists , operates from a non-Leninist
(and in the case of Italy a non-Marxistist) theoretical base,
is (in some instances) compatible with religious doctrines,
and is (in theory) tolerant of the simultaneous existence and
participation of other non-communist political organizations.
In Iran the writings of the late Dr. Ali Shariati may provide
the theoretical basis for the development of a national
communist movement in Iran. Although little is known in the
West about either the man or his writings, it has been re-
ported that his work received wide circulation during the
revolution. In one underground tract entitled "The Science
of Islam" Shariati alledgedly was able to blend the theories
of several European socialist and communist writers together
with the doctrine of Shia Islam into a powerful Iranian
revolutionary manifesto. Shariati 's writings have reportedly
created a sizable Shariati following among Iranian young
people and even among key members of the current regime. The
most conclusive evidence that Shariati ' s theories may serve
as the ideological basis of a new communist movement in Iran
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is the recent emergence of the National Communist Party of
Iran. Should this, or a similar, party eventually come to
power, the impact on Iranian-Soviet relations would be
significant. While a national communist government in
Tehran would be a thorn in the side of the West, it would be
a dagger in the "soft underbelly" of the Soviet Union. For
the Soviets, national communism—whether of the Titoist,
Maoist, Eurocommunist, or Shariati-ist variety—is ideo-
•logically anathema. It is, for Moscow, nothing less than a
heresy. It rejects the dialitical materialism of Marx, the
democratic centralism of Lenin, the totalitarianism of Stalin,
and the neo-imperialism of the current regime. While the
foreign policy of a national communist government would not
differ significantly from that of a social democratic govern-
ment, it would, like the Euro communis ts , be more openly
critical of Soviet policy, and therefore the source of con-
siderable frustration for Moscow. The Soviets would be wise,
therefore, to proceed with caution in Iran so that they do
not find themselves at some future date in a position similar
to that of the U.S. vis a vis the Mossadiq regime in 1953*
According to an Iranian rumor popular at the time, the CIA
spend $5 million to get Mossadiq. into office and $50 million
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